Bourdieu and the Strategic Organization of Time in Organizations

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This research commentary introduces a Bourdieusian perspective to studying the strategic organization of time in organizations. Since the millennium, time, temporality, and history have moved from backstage to frontstage in organization and management research. Particularly, studies ascribing to a strategic organization of time perspective have made important strides in moving the research field beyond objective notions of time as clock-time towards more subjective notions of time. Practice-based perceptions of time have contributed significantly to these promising developments. However, more work remains to be done and Bourdieu’s conceptual framework has, so far, remained underutilized. This article, therefore, discusses the potential of Bourdieu’s work to advance strategic organization of time research within four significant areas, integration of subjective and objective time, temporal experience, embodied history, and reflexivity. The article places emphasis on Bourdieu’s constructs of habitus, field, hysteresis, practice as temporalization, temporal logic of practice, and participant objectivation.

Keywords: Bourdieu, field, habitus, hysteresis, participant objectivation, practice as temporalization, strategic organization of time, temporal logic of practice.

Introduction
The current text is adopted and modified from the author’s PhD dissertation titled: Appropriating Pasts and Futures: A Bourdieusian Perspective on the Strategic Organization of Time. The dissertation was submitted in January and defended in June 2020. The original text was part of the summary statement that draws together five research articles of which four are currently published or forthcoming. The dissertation is about affordances of time, and the work of time, during organizational change in Scandinavian telecommunications company, Telco (pseudonym). The study took place from 2016 to 2018, approximately a quarter century after the privatization of the company. Although change arguably is an inherently temporal phenomenon, the idea that initially guided the study did not include a temporal perspective. However, organically, as the study progressed, time, temporality, and history in various ways emerged as important constructs to grasp, and, later, understand, and explain what transpired in the company during prolonged organizational change in the wake of privatization.
The purpose of this modified version of the text, which I will characterize as a research commentary, is to introduce a Bourdieusian perspective (e.g. 1990, 1992, 2000) to the recently coined construct ‘the strategic organization of time’ (Bansal, Reinecke et al. 2019) – a construct which has emerged in organization and management studies as part of a movement that looks to take the research field beyond objective notions of time as clock-time by drawing attention to time as a social construction. Practice-based approaches have gained considerable traction as a significant part of this movement (Holt and Johnsen 2019), however, this article makes a case that Bourdieu’s work has remained underutilized in strategic organization of time studies (see also Koll 2019, Koll forthcoming, Koll and Ernst forthcoming, Koll and Jensen Schleiter forthcoming). Based on an extensive qualitative review (Randolph 2009) of the strategic organization of time literature, the article argues that four significant areas warrant further investigation in order for the research field to build on its current momentum and advance further. The identified areas are: Integration of subjective and objective time; temporal experience; embodied history; and reflexivity. The article proposes that Bourdieu’s conceptual framework could be a viable pathway to engage with these four areas in novel ways and open up new avenues for understanding the strategic organization of time in organizations. Thus, the article explores how integrating each of these areas with a Bourdieusian perspective might contribute to advancing the research field.

By publishing this commentary in Praktiske Grunde, my hope is to engage Bourdieusian scholars across various fields and disciplines to join the discussion and consider how a Bourdieusian perspective might beneficially be integrated with extant literature on the strategic organization of time.

The article is structured as follows: First, I introduce the theoretical underpinnings of the construct the strategic organization of time. Then, I move on to a qualitative literature review, followed by the analysis of the potential gains of applying a Bourdieusian perspective to the four challenging areas: Integration of subjective and objective time; temporal experience; embodied history; and reflexivity.

Theoretical underpinnings of the strategic organization of time
The strategic organization of time has been defined as “any individual, collective or organizational effort to influence, sustain or redirect the temporal structures and assumptions that shape strategic action” (Bansal, Reinecke et al. 2019). The construct is a reconceptualization of the notion of ‘temporal work’, originally coined by Kaplan and Orlikowski (2013) to account for practices aimed at developing an organization’s strategic options by aligning organizational agents’ interpretations of what transpired in the past; what is at stake in the present; and what might happen in the future.

By drawing on a combination of process- and practice-based views of time (Bansal, Reinecke et al. 2019), the notion of temporal work, and the strategic organization of time, follows an emerging trend in organizational change research of moving beyond conventional understandings of time as objective clock-time that is
independent to events and processes (Hernes and Maitlis 2010). From a process perspective, social phenomena are composed of interlinked events or processes that are continually evolving (Hernes 2014). Temporality is intrinsic to phenomena and social entities are always situated in a temporal context as moments, episodes, or phases in a continuous, sequential chain of process (Hernes 2017). Consequently, changing is not something that happens to things, but the way in which reality is brought into being in every instant (Langley, Smallman et al. 2013). Organizations, therefore, are no more than temporary instantiations of ongoing processes, continually in a state of becoming, or in other words, there is no beginning and end of time but only unfolding moments and ongoing transformation (Tsoukas and Chia 2002). Time is qualitative and subjective with indeterminate trajectories and plural timelines (Ancona, Okhuysen et al. 2001). In this sense, process-time accommodates the possibility of multiple presents, multiple pasts, and multiple futures (Reinecke and Ansari 2017).

The strategic organization of time also draws on the practice-based notion of ‘temporal structuring’ introduced by Orlikowski and Yates (2002). Temporal structures have been defined as the structuring of time into past and future events and horizons that are particular to an organization (Ancona, Goodman et al. 2001, Orlikowski and Yates 2002, Schultz and Hernes 2019). Thus, the notion of temporal structuring rests on the idea that organizations embed temporal structures, norms, and assumptions about time that are continuously produced and reproduced through the recurrent practices of organizational members (Bansal, Reinecke et al. 2019, Holt and Johnsen 2019). Time itself becomes both a medium for, and an outcome of, practices as time is experienced through shared temporal structures that are enacted recurrently through everyday organizational practices (Orlikowski and Yates 2002). Examples of such shared temporal structures could be career trajectories, rhythms, paces, cycles, time dimensions (interpretations of past, present, and future), time manifestations (e.g. productivity, efficiency, urgency), time conceptions (e.g. time as money versus time as events), time horizons (time as a marker of beginnings and ends of a period (Schultz and Hernes 2019)), or temporal depths (“the temporal distances into the past and future that individuals and collectivities typically consider when contemplating events that have happened, may have happened, or may happen” (Bluedorn 2002)). The recurrent enactment of certain temporal structures reproduces their legitimacy, by confirming that which is already being practiced, and enhances their influence on organizational life as they become taken-for-granted assumptions (Orlikowski and Yates 2002). Temporal structures, in this sense, describe the embedded norms, assumptions, and pattern of events and activities that guide the general temporal orientation of organizational agents (Holt and Johnsen 2019, Schultz and Hernes 2019).

The emphasis of the strategic organization of time is on action and agency of organizational agents to influence temporal structures and assumptions, and on how their temporally-oriented activities and practices achieve strategic outcomes (Bansal, Reinecke et al. 2019). By taking this focus, the strategic organization of
time represents a variety of different practices that might be involved in influencing temporal structures and assumptions (Bansal, Reinecke et al. 2019) as well as different modes of action from deliberate strategic forms of intervention to pre-reflexive and embodied modes of action. An inherent implication of the temporal works perspective and the notion of temporal structuring is that organizational agents always are shaped by established temporal structures even as they attempt to act on them (Schultz and Hernes 2013). What organizational agents do, or can do, to intervene must, therefore, take into consideration the embodied, embedded, and material aspects of human agency (Orlikowski and Yates 2002). In this sense, the newly coined construct captures an emerging trend in organizational change research of moving beyond analyses of time and history as objective constructs by approaching time as something co-constructed in organizations (Holt and Johnsen 2019). The strategic organization of time adds to extant research, concerned with the implications of time, temporality, and history for organizational change, a unifying label that draws together the work of scholars otherwise situated in different streams. The literature review, therefore, commence by turning its attention to the dawn of the millennium and the emergence of two distinct research streams in organizational change studies known respectively as the “historic turn” (Clark and Rowlinson 2004, Weatherbee, McLaren et al. 2015, Suddaby 2016) and the “temporal lens” (Ancona, Goodman et al. 2001).

**Organizational change and the scientific arrow of time**

In a literature review by Pettigrew, Woodman et al. (2001) organizational change literature was criticized for being ahistorical, atemporal, aprocessual, and utterly timeless. Consequently, a key challenge for future research, the authors argued, was to include time, history, process, and action in studies of organizational change. A similar call was made by Zald (1996) when he argued that most mainstream journal articles were “written as if they apply to some disembodied, abstracted realm […] as if the paper dealt with some timeless entity”. Both articles argue for the inadequacy of timeless, atemporal analyses to capture the dynamics of change as something continuous, and as something that unfolds in a particular point in time, in a particular context, which itself is subject to continuous change. With reference to Weick and Quinn (1999), Pettigrew, Woodman et al. (2001) contrast a view of change as continuous with a perception of change as movement from one state to another. Classic models of organizational change relied on the latter as change was viewed as progressive sequential movements from position to position (Weick and Quinn 1999, Tsoukas and Chia 2002). Lewin’s (1947) three-phase model of unfreeze, change, and refreeze is widely considered as the precursor of these stage-models of change (Dawson and Sykes 2016). The basic idea of these models is that change is achieved by guiding the organization through a series of planned activities and events after which the change needs to be implemented, anchored, and sustained as the organization reaches a new “frozen” state (Dawson 2014). By depicting change as linear and occurring in a prescribed order over time, stage-models
implicitly represent time as a medium through which change occurs (Van de Ven and Poole 2005). Change is seen to move ever-forward along the arrow of time “in which the past is determinant (it has happened and cannot be changed), where the future is full of indeterminate potentialities (it has not yet happened so has not yet come into being), and in which the present is simply a series of now moments (which at one time was a future possibility and soon will be a past moment that cannot be changed)” (Dawson and Sykes 2016). Consequently, time in episodic accounts of change mainly featured as an implicit backdrop of events rendered to be of little conceptual or explanatory importance (Noss 2002, Wiebe 2010, Dawson 2014).

In a similar vein, organizational change studies predominantly approached history as unchangeable facts which can only be objectively known (Brunninge 2009). Consequently, when history has been addressed, it has often featured as a variable or as background information explaining the current situation of an organization (Ericson 2006). By taking a view of history as objective truth, essentially synonymous with a fixed past, studies of organizational and strategic change have typically been concerned with history as an explanation of inertia or path dependencies (Booth 2003, Ericson 2006, Wadhwani, Suddaby et al. 2018). Hence, the predominant representation of history has been characterized by the rather deterministic perception that, with the passing of time, organizations get stuck in development paths through which human agency and strategic choice are limited by decisions in the past. History then has predominantly been treated as a constraining influence on organizational change (Brunninge 2009, Suddaby and Foster 2017, Koll 2019, Koll forthcoming).

A new era: From time-related research to research on time
Since the millennium, the research field of organizational change has seen an increase of studies looking to move beyond conceptions of time and history as background variables, or to phrase it in the words of Lee and Liebenau (1999), to do “research on time” rather than “time-related research”. Organization and management studies have broadly been subject to a temporal transition or a movement from an era where temporality was only occasionally addressed to one in which time and temporality have become research topics in their own right (Whipp, Adam et al. 2002, Roe, Waller et al. 2009, Holt and Johnsen 2019). The notion of this transition or movement is supported by the emergence of the “historic turn” (Clark and Rowlinson 2004, Weatherbee, McLaren et al. 2015, Suddaby 2016) and the “temporal lens” (Ancona, Goodman et al. 2001) research streams.

The historic turn
The purpose of the historic turn is to integrate historical methods and historical reasoning into organization studies (Bucheli and Wadhwani 2014). The calls for the integration of history date back to the early 1990s when a group of leading organization scholars problematized prevailing approaches to history in organization
studies (e.g. Zald 1993, Kieser 1994, Zald 1996, Burrell 1997). However, it was not until 2004 that these calls were described by Clark and Rowlinson as a historic turn. Since, scholarly interest in history-work and engagement with the past as process and context, and not merely a variable, has been thriving (Weatherbee, McLaren et al. 2015). Discussions about the problems, challenges, and potentials associated with doing history-work and integrating historical methods and reasoning into organization and management studies have become an established part of mainstream organizational research resulting in an impressive array of special issues (e.g. Rowlinson, Casey et al. 2014, Mills, Suddaby et al. 2016, Wadhwani, Suddaby et al. 2018, Suddaby, Coraiola et al. 2020), books (e.g. Bucheli and Wadhwani 2014, McLaren, Mills et al. 2015, Mills and Novicevic 2019), conference activities, and so on. The debates surrounding the theoretical and methodological challenges and opportunities involved in an engagement with the past have also directed attention to the potential of historical analyses to advance our understandings of strategic and organizational change (Ericson 2006, Brunninge 2009, Suddaby and Foster 2017). A particularly popular approach in this regard has been the so-called “uses of the past” stream concerned with the study of how the past is used for managerial purposes in the present (Wadhwani, Suddaby et al. 2018). The approach marks a significant break with conventional positivist, objective conceptions of history by representing the past as a source of social symbolic resources available for a wide variety of creative uses, for example shaping organizational identity, managing strategic change, and creating and managing issues of power (Wadhwani, Suddaby et al. 2018). The frontrunner of the uses of the past approach has been rhetorical history defined as “the strategic use of the past as a persuasive strategy to manage key stakeholders of the firm” (Suddaby, Foster et al. 2010). Based on the notion of historical narratives as an asset that can be deployed strategically for the purpose of managing change to achieve competitive advantage, the construct implicitly assumes a temporal work perspective (Bansal, Reinecke et al. 2019). Rhetorical history is underpinned by the assumption that organizational agents possess high degrees of agency in the construction and reconstruction of historical narratives, and that the skillful development and deployment of historical narratives are crucial for organizational change to be successful (Foster, Coraiola et al. 2017). Consequently, the past is represented not as unchangeable facts but as subjective, interpretive, and malleable (Suddaby, Foster et al. 2010). Other noteworthy contributions to historical organization studies is the notion of organizational mnemonics (Coraiola and Murcia 2020) and the rapidly emergent literature on organizational memory studies (Foroughi, Coraiola et al. 2020, Foster, Coraiola et al. 2020, Foster, Wiebe et al. forthcoming) which are concerned with the ways that remembering and forgetting shape, and are shaped by, organizations and organizing processes.

**The temporal lens**

In addition to the historic turn, Ancona, Goodman, et al.’s (2001) introduction of the temporal lens brought issues of time, timing, pace, cycles, rhythms, flow,
temporal orientation, and cultural meanings of time to the forefront and set in motion a greater consideration of time and temporality in organizational change studies. The increased attention to time is illustrated by a considerable number of special issues (e.g. Goodman, Ancona et al. 2001, Hernes, Simpson et al. 2013, Langley, Smallman et al. 2013, Bakker, DeFillippi et al. 2016, Bansal, Reinecke et al. 2019), books (e.g. Whipp, Adam et al. 2002, Hernes 2014, Dawson and Sykes 2016), conference tracks, sub-themes, and so on. While traditional approaches to organizational change laid heavy emphasis on objective time, by characterizing change as episodic, progressive movement along the arrow of time, towards desired outcomes (Dawson and Sykes 2016), current work has been concerned with developing approaches to accommodate multiple times and temporalities (Whipp, Adam et al. 2002, Holt and Johnsen 2019). Scholars have argued that the way people experience time has largely been neglected as a result of traditional over-emphasis on objective clock-time, in which the past, present, and future are outside of each other, and outside of human experience (Hernes, Simpson et al. 2013, Dawson and Sykes 2016). Hence, similarly to the historic turn, the constitution of time itself and different forms of time have become a topic for scholarly debate. Derived from these discussions seems to be an objective-subjective dichotomy of time (Orlikowski and Yates 2002, Hernes, Simpson et al. 2013, Holt and Johnsen 2019) in which objective time is generally associated with a metaphysical linear chronology captured by the clock, and subjective time is generally associated with interpretive notions of heterogeneous, multidirectional time (Shipp and Cole 2015).

Process- and practice-based studies have contributed significantly to these discussions about different forms of time and the interrelation between our assumptions about time and our conceptions of agency and change (Holt and Johnsen 2019). Processual thinking in its most radical form breaks with traditional conventional organizational change theory by subscribing to an ontology of process metaphysics in which organizations are viewed as reifications of processes (Chia 2002). In this view, change is not a process that happens to an organization – organizations are instantiations of ongoing processes of organizing (verb) and becoming. Change, therefore, is viewed as ongoing rather than episodic (Tsoukas and Chia 2002, Langley, Smallman et al. 2013). Processual thinking emphasizes the continuity of past, present, and future, and the temporal experience of organizational agents as they live in the flow of time (Hernes, Simpson et al. 2013).

Practice-based approaches have gained significant ground to a degree where organization and management studies have acknowledged and embraced a “practice turn” (Cetina, Schatzki et al. 2001). While there is no such thing as a unified theory of practice, practice-based approaches are constituted by the shared beliefs that 1) social phenomena transpire within and are parts of a field or nexus of interconnected human practices, and 2) “practices are embodied, materially mediated arrays of human activity centrally organized around shared practical understanding” (Cetina, Schatzki et al. 2001). Thus, generally speaking, practice-based approaches add to a processual view a particular emphasis on the body, materiality, and the historical
and social conditions in which processes unfold (Nicolini and Monteiro 2017). One of the strengths of practice-based approaches is their ability to dissolve dualisms (Cetina, Schatzki et al. 2001, Gomez 2015) – an ability which has frequently been deployed in the case of the subjective-objective time dichotomy (Holt and Johnsen 2019). From a practice-based point of view, time is simultaneously constituted in, and constituting of human action or thought (Orlikowski and Yates 2002). The practice approach understands human existence as temporally constituted, and time, therefore, is never external to practice but emerges in an ongoing dialectic between objective and subjective temporal structures (Bourdieu 2000). Consequently, objective time is not objective in the factual sense of the word, but versions of subjective time which are objectified, that is, institutionally embedded, and embodied through ongoing social practice (Holt and Johnsen 2019). Agency is a temporally embedded process through which present action draws simultaneously on the past and the future as epistemic resources acquired through practical experience (Emirbayer and Mische 1998, Orlikowski and Yates 2002, Koll and Jensen Schleiter forthcoming). Practice, thus, is seen as acts of temporalization in which the acting agent mobilizes past and future, as a sense of bodily knowledge, to either confirm or transform practices (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, Kaplan and Orlikowski 2013). A prime example of the impact of the practice turn in organizational change studies is the emergence of the Strategy as Practice movement (SAP) (Golsorkhi, Rouleau et al. 2015). The movement represents a break with traditional notions of strategy and planned change as properties of organizations. Instead, SAP views strategy as activities or practices, thus shifting from a substantialist ontology to a more processual view in which the world of strategy is relationally configured, that is, continuously created and recreated through the social interactions of organizational agents and stakeholders (Golsorkhi, Rouleau et al. 2015).

**Challenges for future research**

The efforts described above have all contributed to making time an explicit theme and integral part of organizational change research. The strategic organization of time presents an additional perspective from which to study the work of time in relations to organizational change. However, if the construct the strategic organization of time is to move the literature further and significantly add to the above, there are issues that warrant further attention and development. Thus, in the following, I demonstrate how strategic organization of time research might fruitfully be integrated with a Bourdieusian perspective.

Inspired by Heidegger and Husserl’s thoughts on social being with time, Bourdieu considered time and history as central to understanding human beings and the relations between them (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, Gorski 2013, Atkinson 2018). Bourdieu’s work has been described as a radically temporalized theory of social life (Gorski 2013). This is reflected in Bourdieu’s life long effort to merge sociology and history in a way that “history would be a historical sociology of the past and sociology would be a social history of the present” (Steinmetz 2011).
Bourdieu’s three pillar concepts, habitus, field, and capital essentially makes up three different forms of existence of history (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, Steinmetz 2011, Atkinson 2018). In this sense, a Bourdieusian perspective provides us with a temporal vocabulary that can bring philosophical writings into the actuality of managing and organizing – a feature which current literature is lacking (Hernes, Simpson et al. 2013). Bourdieu’s work is characterized by a significant devotion of attention to the temporal constitution of conscious experience (e.g. Bourdieu 1963, Bourdieu 1990, Bourdieu 2000), and he adds to the strategic organization of time a radical historicism (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) by grounding his theory of practice in the triple historicization of the agent (habitus), the world (social space and fields), and of the methods and models of the researcher (reflexivity) (Wacquant 2016). Practice, to Bourdieu, is seen to perform a complex array of temporalities from the immediacy of the here-and-now of invested agents to the gradual unfolding of habitus in the slow and long flowing time of memory and history (Nicolini 2012). This makes a Bourdieusian perspective particularly well-suited to address the challenges for future research on the strategic organization of time.

A temporal logic of practice

Bourdieu’s theory of practice takes as its primary epistemic object what people do when they are in practical relation to the world, that is, the immersed, involved, active engagement in the world through which the world imposes itself on the acting agent as a sense of urgency, the pressure of things to do, places to go, of busyness and business, and so forth (Nicolini 2012). This implies that practice unfolds in time and only exists in the temporal unfolding of its urgency (Bourdieu 2000). Practice is inseparable from temporality because it is immersed in the current of time, played out in time, and sometimes plays strategically with time, timing, and tempo (Bourdieu 1990). Consequently, the logic of the practitioner is based on the temporal, emotional, and improvisational dimension of practice (Nicolini 2012). Timing is especially critical, for example, in the practice of courting, calling somebody too soon after getting their phone number might come off as desperate; while waiting too long to call will seem like a token of disinterest. Either of these options might lose you the chance of seeing the person again. The practice of joking is another example; a joke at the right time, in the right place, with the right audience might get a standing ovation, whereas the same joke in another temporal context might get the one telling the joke beat up or worse. One of Bourdieu’s classical examples to explain the logic of practice and the work of time is the practice of gift giving (1990). In many cases, returning a favor with a gift too soon is bound to look like a payment, whereas delaying the response too long will seem like ungratefulness. By the same token, a gift to a teacher before exams constitutes a bribe but the same gesture after exams becomes a showing of appreciation for the teachers’ work. Thus, in the words of Bourdieu “awareness of time is not simply one of the dimensions of life […] experience, but rather the form in terms of which that experience
is organized” (1963). In other words, it is the temporal structure of practice, such as rhythm, pace, and directionality, that constitutes its form and meaning (Bourdieu 1990).

Integration of subjective and objective time: Habitus and field dialectic
The integration of objective and subjective forms of time is a recurrent concern across the board of organizational change research. In an extensive review Shipp and Cole (2015) argue for the need to develop ‘completely temporal approaches’, integrating clock-time with individuals’ perception of time. The development of completely temporal approaches, they argue, will enable a deeper understanding of the retrospections and anticipations that shape organizational agents’ responses to organizational change. In a similar vein, Dawson (2014), Dawson and Sykes (2016) deem the integration of objective and subjective forms of time integral to the development of change management theories. The authors suggest an integral approach called ‘temporal awareness’ (2014, 2016) to accommodate the fact that objective forms of time, such as clocks and calendars, are an embedded part of organizational practice and change initiatives, while the temporal experience of change, such as interpretations of present events and expectations for the future, is subjective. The integration of objective and subjective forms of time are also important from a historical perspective. Suddaby (2016) introduces the concept of ‘historical consciousness’ to draw attention to the interaction between history’s structural, objective dimensions and its interpretive, subjective dimensions, or in other words between the passing of time and temporal experience. These dimensions are seen as mutually constitutive in ongoing interaction. Hence, the development of bridging constructs combining the objective functions of history as fact with the subjective elements of history as interpretive context is perceived as integral to theory development (Koll forthcoming, Koll and Jensen Schleiter forthcoming).

Bourdieu’s conceptual framework offers an alternative middle ground – a third way – between methodological individualism (the idea that all social entities are reducible to individual agents or groups thereof) and structuralism (the idea that social phenomena are determined by causes external to agents and their practices) (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, Chia and Holt 2006, Gomez 2015). In order to sidestep the dilemma of the often-found dualism between the agent and the structure, Bourdieu introduces the concepts of habitus and field, understood as two modes of existence of history brought together in action (Bourdieu 1981, Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, Bourdieu 2000). The dialectic between field and habitus, understood as the objectified, embedded products and the incorporated, embodied products of historical practice, constitutes the system through which practical knowledge is constructed (Bourdieu 1981). The principle of this construction is a system of structured and structuring dispositions, also known as the habitus (Bourdieu 1990). The habitus has a double historicity to it in the sense that it accommodates the fact that agents are products of historical structures while at the same time put to work these historical structures in practice. In other words, practice
is the product of a habitus which is itself a product of the embodiment of the objectified historical structures of the field (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). In this sense, a Bourdieusian perspective on the strategic organization of time emphasizes the relational and dispositional nature of practice, reminding us that “all strategies enacted amid the flow of time, not only have a history but unfold history through a practice associated with a past” (Ericson, Melin et al. 2015). The relation between habitus and field bridges objective and subjective temporal structures in a way that allows us to explain how objectified history manifests itself in the daily conducts of agents in a manner that makes them neither fully determined by external causes nor guided solely by internal reasons (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). Thus, Bourdieu’s conceptual framework offers an alternative theorization of embedded agency, action, and strategic practices.

To Bourdieu, the social world is constituted by relationally configured fields, social spaces with a relative degree of autonomy from wider societal dominant powers for a certain kind of practice (Steinmetz 2011). A field consists of multidimensional structures of domination and struggle governed by a distinct logic which defines the rules and resources that secure legitimacy and authority in the eyes of dominant and dominated groups of agents occupying the field (Atkinson 2018). The ongoing struggle of agents is guided by possession of one or more forms of capital, such as social capital (relations, network, connections), cultural capital (legitimate knowledge, education, competencies), and symbolic capital (accumulated prestige or recognition) (Kerr and Robinson 2009). Capital accumulation, in this sense, constitutes what is at stake in a field – a specific interest in which agents are emotionally invested. Capital is both the process within and product of a field – stake and resource - and the distribution of capital constitutes the structure of the field at a given time (Bourdieu 1986). Being involved in a field is comparable to taking part in a social game in which agents continuously strive to preserve or accumulate capital, maintain or improve position, through a series of strategic moves. The intuitive feel for the repertoire of moves that are possible or take meaning within a given practice is generated by the habitus (Mérand and Forget 2012).

The habitus is a product of history or past experience in a particular field – a structured structure conditioned by environment, initial disposition, position in the field, and social trajectory. At the same time, habitus is also a structuring structure which generates and organizes practices in a way that they can be spontaneously adapted to the necessity of a situation without expressed calculation or conscious planning (Gomez 2015). In other words, the habitus is a historically acquired system of generative schemes of perception, action, and thought which makes itself present in practice by ensuring their constancy over time (Bourdieu 1990). Thus, through the habitus, the historical structures of which it is the product, governs practices by providing a patterned consistency of action (Chia and Holt 2006). Hence, neither intentional nor fully determined, strategic action comes from historically transmitted dispositions to act and beliefs that were constituted during past experience in a particular field (Mérand and Forget 2012). The habitus makes up a
practical competency, acquired in and for action, that operates beneath the level of consciousness and which is continually defined and redefined as it is deployed (Wacquant 2016). While the habitus is inclined to generate practices shaped after the social structures of which it is the product, Bourdieu persistently argues, the habitus is not a destiny or the replica of a single social structure. It is a system of open mechanisms subject to continuous revision in practice (Bourdieu and Chartier 2015). Hence, dispositions are durable but not eternal (Wacquant 2016).

The temporal structuring of consciousness arises through a habitus socialized in a field of practice. Through practical experience, immersion, and investment in a field, agents acquire a set of dispositions, a sense of belonging and owning that endows them with a sense for what is likely or unlikely, possible or impossible inscribed into present experience (Atkinson 2018). The practical sense or feel for the game (a metaphor frequently used by Bourdieu) is guided by doxa which constitutes the unquestioned shared beliefs, or internalized sense of limits of field agents. Through mutual adjustments between habitus and field, doxas are maintained as practice confirms that which is recognized as true and important about the world is true and important (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). For example, objectified or instituted history accumulated over time in books, material objects, customs, law, etc. becomes historical action, enacted, active history when agents, by virtue of their habitus, are inclined to and capable of appropriating them, for instance following customs, respecting laws, and reading certain books (Bourdieu 1981). Bourdieu describes the doxic relation to the world as a native relationship to a familiar world in which “history as ‘subject’ discovers itself in history as ‘object’[…] a body, appropriated by history, absolutely and immediately appropriates things inhabited by the same history” (1981). In other words, a habitus attuned to the imminent tendencies of the field generates a certain modality of action in which agents pre-perceptively inscribes the objective potentialities of the future into the present moment and feel their way through without conscious thought (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). Bourdieu calls this modality of action practice as temporalization (Bourdieu 2000). However, a habitus is not always adjusted to its situation; radical field-level changes, altering the rules of the game can cause for the habitus and field to fall out of sync with each other (Kerr and Robinson 2009). In such situations, dispositions become dysfunctional, causing agents to become consciously aware of their practice and thereby creating a different modality of action and a different relationship with time (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, Koll forthcoming, Koll and Ernst forthcoming). This will be elaborated in the following.

Temporal experience: Practice as temporalization

The integration of objective and subjective time in action inherently facilitates a greater consideration for what Hernes, Simpson et al. (2013) call the ‘temporal experience of management’ or ‘managing in time’. The implications of historical consciousness for example run deeper than simply approaching temporality as a lens selectively applied by the researcher. History is not just ‘out there’ as objective
chronology, background information, or longitudinal perspective that can be observed by the researcher from an ongoing present; history is also ‘in here’ as lived experience - a social construction (Pettigrew, Woodman et al. 2001). Historical consciousness then, is derived from an attentiveness to the past as something that is alive in the present, carried forward in the bodies and consciousness of organizational agents (Koll and Jensen Schleiter forthcoming). Building on the tension and interplay between history as fact and history as context (Suddaby 2016), history should be viewed as an ongoing process of knowledge construction that is constitutive “in shaping how actors define their own sense of self and action in time, and in emphasizing how their interpretation of the past shapes their experience in the present, their expectations for the future, and the choices they make” (Wadhwani, Suddaby et al. 2018). In other words, historical consciousness, as well as the temporal experience of management, is concerned with being in time (e.g. Heidegger 2010), that is, the way time (or the passing of time), as an inherent feature of organizational life, shapes the very being of things (Hernes, Simpson et al. 2013).

Bourdieu’s conceptualization of practice as temporalization (Bourdieu 2000) ties temporality and action inseparably together by approaching questions of temporality from the point of view of the acting agent (Adkins 2009). By reconstructing this point of view, Bourdieu explains, we are able to break with the metaphysical vision of time as something external to agents and their actions (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, Bourdieu 2000). In this sense, a Bourdieusian perspective breaks with predominant notions in organizational change literature of time as an a priori condition transcendent to historicity. Furthermore, as briefly touched upon above the relationship between habitus and field, ranging from perfect fit to radical disjunction, imply different modalities of action and different relations with time (Bourdieu 2000). Bourdieu’s conceptual framework, thus, adds to the strategic organization of time the possibility to comprehensively theorize how organizational change affects the temporal experience of agents, and how temporal experience shapes their responses to organizational change (Koll and Ernst forthcoming).

Time, for Bourdieu, is constituted in practice (Adkins 2009). In other words, practice does not take place in time – rather, practical action makes time in the sense that the invested agent draws on the past and the future in the present (Bourdieu 2000). In order to explain how this transpires, I will turn to the concept of protention which originates from Husserl’s phenomenological notion that the perceived present always reaches backwards and forwards in time framed by a horizon of history and futurity. Protention is what constitutes the habitus (Atkinson 2018). Defined as a pre-reflexive aiming at a forthcoming, protention is what enables the basketball player to adjust not to what he sees but to what he anticipates, i.e. sees in advance in the perceived present (Bourdieu 1990). The amount of time that makes up the present is the whole of an action brought together by a perception including both the retained past and the anticipated future (Bourdieu 1963). Vis-à-vis the future, a very important distinction to Bourdieu is that between the experienced forthcoming, understood as a future which is inscribed in the present as practical expectations,
and a contingent future, understood as a possible which may or may not happen (Adkins 2009). By making this distinction, Bourdieu extends Heidegger’s work on “building” and “dwelling” modes of existence, that is, two different ways of being in the world each of which afford a different modality of action, a different understanding of agency (Chia and Holt 2006), and a different relationship with time. The building mode is characterized by what Bourdieu terms a philosophy of consciousness (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) assuming action to be guided by predefined goals that direct effort towards desired outcomes – in other words, purposeful planned action, presuming a mean-ends logic (Chia and Holt 2006). The building mode is underpinned by a metaphysical vision of time as something external to the agent in which case strategic management relies on projecting an organization into a contingent future and to overcome future uncertainties through deliberate calculated forecasting (e.g. Bourdieu 1963, Chia and Rasche 2010). In a building mode, agents are viewed as rather autonomous meaning that they have the same ability as the observer or the analyst of placing themselves outside of practice by making conscious discursive representations and logical accounts of their actions (Bourdieu 1990).

Protention, which according to Bourdieu, is the primary way in which practitioners relate to the world (Atkinson 2018) constitutes a dwelling mode of existence. The dwelling mode assumes agents to be so entwined and involved with their practice that it becomes an extension of them making them unaware of any cognitive separation between themselves and the object of action (Chia 2004). This implies that agents spend most of their time in a mode of total pre-occupation and practical immersion in the game (Bourdieu 2000). Consequently, actions take the form of purposive practical coping directed towards overcoming immediate impediments. In other words, agents rely on their feel for the game, i.e. their capacity for pre-preceptive anticipation, to guide their actions without the need for distance, perspective, or reflection (Chia and Holt 2006). Thus, the most common form in which agents experience time is that of time passing unnoticed; because, to the engaged agent the future does not present itself as a cognitive representation of possibilities, it is already present in the configuration of the game as practical expectations (Bourdieu 2000, Koll and Ernst forthcoming). In this sense, the dwelling mode of existence precipitates an immanent logic of practice, that is, a kind of absorbed intentionality within the configurations of practice itself (Chia and MacKay 2007).

**Embodied history: Habitus as bodily knowledge**

Extant studies of the strategic organization of time, for instance studies of rhetorical history (Suddaby, Foster et al. 2016), have predominantly focused on the strategic and deliberate appropriation of the past to achieve desired outcomes. In this sense, the literature has privileged the explicit and planned forms of temporal work and the rational and calculative processes of intervention in temporal matters. However, as described above, historical consciousness and the temporal experience of management imply that “humans are historical beings who experience the world
through historical consciousness in ways that are not limited only to rational and reflective relationships with the past“ (Wadhwani, Suddaby et al. 2018). History is embodied as memory both in material artefacts, through which historical knowledge is transmitted across time (e.g. Howard-Grenville, Metzger et al. 2013, Schultz and Hernes 2013, Hatch and Schultz 2017), or in the human body as skills, dispositions, sensibilities, and preferences (Bourdieu 1981, Chia 2004, Chia and Holt 2006, Koll and Jensen Schleiter forthcoming). Yet, the non-rational, implicit, and tacit ways in which organizational agents draw upon their historically transmitted bodily knowledge in the context of organizational change are understudied (Wadhwani, Suddaby et al. 2018). Strategy-as-practice scholars concur with this assessment by asserting that the ‘living role of history’ (Ericson and Melin 2010), that is, the way strategy practitioners non-deliberately draw on their history in situ, has been missing in SAP literature (Chia and Holt 2006, Tsoukas 2010, Hydle 2015).

For Bourdieu, “the principle of practical comprehension is not a knowing consciousness […] but the practical sense of a habitus inhabited by the world it inhabits, pre-occupied by the world in which it actively intervenes, in an immediate relationship of involvement, tension and attention, which constructs the world and gives it meaning” (Bourdieu 2000). The habitus is embodied history internalized as second nature (Bourdieu 1990). Practical knowing is not a state of mind but a state of the body, meaning that principles and regulations of social life are inscribed on the body without the mediation of mind and consciousness (Bourdieu 1990, Schatzki 2019). Consequently, practical knowledge, the capacity for pre-perceptive anticipation, is essentially a corporeal knowledge that provides a practical comprehension of the world (Bourdieu 2000). In this sense, the body is integral to uncovering the logic of practical sense (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). By conceptualizing practical action as the encounter between habitus, understood as history in bodies, and field, understood as history in things, a Bourdieusian approach inherently draws attention to history as something carried forward in bodies (Koll and Jensen Schleiter forthcoming). The habitus, Bourdieu explains, is the active presence of the whole past of which it is the product – “it is that presence of the past in the present which makes possible the presence in the present of the forthcoming” (2000). Thus, through the concept of habitus, a Bourdieusian perspective offers to the strategic organization of time a theoretical construct to explain the living role of history in strategic action; in other words, the way history is operative in shaping present future-oriented activities of practically invested agents. It follows that habitus allows us to see temporal work as something which need not be restricted to purposeful activities of conscious agents but might as well be derived from dispositions historically acquired through engagement in a field of practice.

Bourdieu’s heavy emphasis on habitus as practical competency operating beneath the level of consciousness has often got his work criticized for being too structuralist or determinist, leaving little room for agency, rational choice, and change (Nicolini 2012, Yang 2014). Bourdieu and proponents of his work reject
these criticisms, arguing that they rest on a superficial or unthorough reading of his work (e.g. Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, Gorski 2013). Another often-found counterargument to the criticism of determinism is the construct of hysteresis – a term Bourdieu uses to explain those instances when the subjective expectations of the habitus, or sense of a probable future, and the objective conditions of the field fall out of sync with each other as a result of radical change (Kerr and Robinson 2009, Koll 2019, Koll forthcoming). During times of crises, Bourdieu argues, when the routine adjustment between objective and subjective structures is abruptly disrupted, the habitus needs time to adapt to the new rules of the game (Bourdieu 2000, Koll and Ernst forthcoming). Hysteresis is a technical term, originally adopted from the research field of physics (for an in-depth account of the construct see Hardy 2008, Koll forthcoming), that describes the time-lag or hiatus during which the habitus generate dispositions for action generated under circumstances which no longer apply due to changes so radical that the habitus no longer recognizes itself in the field structures it encounters (Bourdieu 1990).

Hysteresis makes way for a state of heightened consciousness – an awareness of practice, depriving agents of their sense for the game, that is, of their capacity for pre-perceptive anticipation. In other words, the immediate fit between habitus and field allows agents complete immersion in the moment to a point of not noticing the passing of time, but a habitus and field out of sync with each other make agents conscious of their actions and of time passage, giving rise to feelings such as impatience and dissatisfaction with the present (Bourdieu 2000, Koll and Ernst forthcoming). Hysteresis, thus, presents an opportunity for strategic organization of time scholars to demonstrate the interdependency and interplay between subjective and objective modes of existence of time, that is habitus and field, and tie this interplay to agents’ experiences of time and to the different modes of action available to them. While I have argued extensively for the avenues hysteresis – as construct as well as phenomenon – opens for advancing our understanding of the work of time during organizational change (see Koll 2019, Koll forthcoming, Koll and Ernst forthcoming), critics still have a case that descriptions of how rational and reflexive action unfolds is under-developed or difficult to trace in Bourdieu’s work (Nicolini 2012). Yang (2014) for example highlights a section in Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992), suggesting that during times of crises, the lines of action proposed by the habitus might be accompanied by rational calculation, at least, as Bourdieu explains, “among those agents who are in a position to be rational”. However, the section does not offer any additional explanation for example of what constitutes “a position to be rational”. While this presents a deficiency in Bourdieu’s work, other studies have begun to take interest in the phenomenon of hysteresis by mapping and interlinking field positions with strategies deployed to overcome hysteresis, e.g. in the educational sociology field (Abrahams and Ingram 2013, Abrahams and Ingram 2015). These studies have inspired the author of this current article to pursue a similar line of inquiry for the study of organizational change (Koll 2019, Koll forthcoming). However, the relationship between structure and agency,
determinism and reflexivity, remains a topic of debate in organization and management studies (e.g. Mutch 2003, Mutch, Delbridge et al. 2006, Elder-Vass 2007).

Despite these discussions, it is the argument of this article that habitus still constitutes a thinking tool of unparalleled explanatory power in relations to questions of embodied history. Habitus helps us explain how practical knowledge is inscribed in the body, sustained within a collective, and how objective history reveal itself in the everyday actions of organizational agents (Nicolini 2012) without determining them. The dialectic, through which the field reproduces the habitus and the habitus reproduces the field, produces agency but it is an agency constrained by (Kerr and Robinson 2009), or reconceptualized along (Chia and Holt 2006), the dispositional and relational dimensions of practice. In this sense, the habitus reminds us that agents have a history and are the product of an individual history and of a collective history, and that history is inscribed in their bodies through practical experience (Bourdieu and Chartier 2015).

**Reflexivity: Participant objectivation**

“How a researcher conceptualizes time and makes assumptions about time and temporality leads to different understandings of organizational phenomena” (Reinecke and Ansari 2017). While time and history have snowballed from backstage to frontstage of organizational change studies over the past two decades, leading scholars have now begun to assess the implications of this emergent scholarly interest. Calls are especially being made for more reflexive approaches to the study of time, taking into consideration how the epistemological dimensions of our conceptualizations of time impact the way we relate to organizational change. Reinecke and Ansari (2017), for instance, direct our attention to how some theoretical constructs highlight the entitative aspects of organizational phenomena while others highlight the more emergent aspects. Accordingly, scholars are reminded to be mindful and engage reflexively with the theorization of time and change. In a similar vein, Dawson (2014) criticizes extant change research for representing change “in an image projected through an imposed temporal lens” characterized by an unreflective temporal orientation. In response, Dawson proposes an approach of ‘temporal awareness’, a central feature of which is to pay attention to the way time and temporality is being used and conceptualized not just by organizational agents but, equally important, by the researcher.

The calls for more reflexive approaches in studies of time in relations to organizational change are also echoed by historic turn scholars. Bucheli and Wadhwani (2014), for instance, argue that the increasing integration of history into organization studies ‘has been accompanied with little reflection or dialogue about what is meant by ‘history’ and exactly why and how it matters for understanding managers, organizations, and markets”. Perhaps the most thorough and instructive response to the absence of reflexive research approaches comes from Suddaby and Foster (2017) in a research commentary on history and organizational change. The article applies historical consciousness to studying organizational change, understood as a
heightened reflexivity and appreciation for the way implicit assumptions about history and time shape our conceptualizations of change and perceptions about change agency. The paper instructively illustrates how theories of organizational change implicitly assume different models of history all of which imply varying degrees of agency for change. Consequently, the authors argue, if managers can become aware of their implicit assumptions about the past and reframe them, history can be a valuable resource for organizational change management.

According to Bourdieu, the fact that the logic of practice is made up of ambiguities, indeterminacies, feelings, and situated clues is also what makes it so difficult to produce scientific accounts of practice (Nicolini 2012). The temporal dimension of practice, particularly, creates a number of pitfalls for the researcher; one of which is to be confused the agent’s point of view with the researcher’s point of view and, thus, imposing a theoretical logic over the logic of practice (Bourdieu 1990). Being on the outside – without investment in the game – Bourdieu explains, inclines scientific accounts to exclude the effects of time and thereby provide detemporalized accounts of practice, substituting its subtle sense of timing and appropriateness with a formal logic of rules (Bourdieu 2000). The opposition between the practical mode of knowledge and the theoretical mode of knowledge is a recurrent emphasis in Bourdieu’s work captured by frequently cited statements such as “practice has a logic which is not that of the logician” (1990), and “science has a time which is not that of practice” (1990). It follows that epistemic reflexivity, or the historicization of the categories and methods of the researcher, is a hallmark of Bourdieu’s science of practice (Bourdieu 2003, Wacquant 2004, Kerr and Robinson 2009, Wacquant 2016). Reflexivity in the Bourdieusian sense is a process of what he calls participant objectivation, of turning the principles of research onto the researcher him or herself. Objectivation entails a critical examination of one’s own stakes and interests in the research project and of the position from which the research is undertaken (Kerr and Robinson 2009).

The researcher is urged to be mindful of the position he or she occupies within the academic community and of the historical trajectory that led to that position. In other words, the historical circumstances and conditions that made it possible to engage with the research project in the first place needs to be brought to light for the researcher to gain perspective and distance (Bourdieu 2003). “One should know the world better and better as one knows oneself better, scientific knowledge and knowledge of oneself and one’s own social unconscious advance hand in hand, and that primary experience transformed by scientific practice transforms scientific practice and vice versa” (Grenfell 2006). It follows that avoiding the mistake of imposing the atemporal time of science over the time of practice (Bourdieu 1990) is not done simply through objectivation of participants – it has to include the point of view of the objectivizer and the interests he or she might have in objectivation (Bourdieu 2003). In this sense, one could say that Bourdieu’s approach to research adds an additional level of historical consciousness by scrutinizing (through historicization) not just the objects of the study, and the implicit assumptions and
theoretical models applied by the researcher, but the very conditions, possibilities, and motivations for undertaking the research in the first place (see Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, Nicolini and Monteiro 2017). In other words, participant objectivation implies an objectivation of the researcher as subject, and as an object of the research process, by taking into account the social trajectory and habitus of the researcher at the time in which the research was undertaken (Kerr and Robinson 2009). Habitus, in this sense, becomes both the topic of investigation and the tool of investigation (Wacquant 2011), directing the researchers attention to his or her own temporal trajectory and assumptions and their implications for the research undertaken.

Conclusion
This article has discussed the potential of Bourdieu’s conceptual framework, and research approach, to advance research on the strategic organization of time in organizations. Based on a qualitative literature review, including the historic turn and the temporal lens in organization and management studies, the article identified four areas that each presents some challenges for future research in the field. The areas were: Integration of subjective and objective time, temporal experience, embodied history, and reflexivity. With a particular emphasis on the constructs of habitus, field, hysteresis, practice as temporalization, temporal logic of practice, and participant objectivation, the article has discussed how a Bourdieusian perspective might beneficially be integrated with extant literature and offer novel ways of approaching the four areas in which further development is warranted. The article asserts that Bourdieu’s work is underutilized in strategic organization of time research and encourages fellow Bourdieusian scholars to explore further this untapped potential.

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Praktiske Grunde