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Introduction:

Politics, Social Class and Education

Ylva Bergström

This issue of *Praktiske Grunde* collects articles that are held together by a general analysis of the social aspects of the 'political', and attempts to understand the relationship between social class on the one hand and on the other hand political opinions, interest and practices.

Over the past decades we have witnessed a growing scholarly interest in citizens' decline in political participation and a changing political agenda. In two of the articles of this issue distance and proximity in political opinions, interests and attitudes are mapped in purpose to analyze the relationship between different political orientations. In "Conservative Distinctions: Moral and Cultural conservatism" Jan-Magnus Enele unveil a multidimensionality in the political space, showing how socio-cultural political orientations are divided into moral and cultural distinctions and its correspondence to capital volume and composition. The analysis is carried out on data from Swedish elections studies in year of 2006. The case of young rural citizens political position-takings are in focus in Ylva Bergström and Tobias Dalberg's article, revealing a space of political position-takings structured by oppositions regarding redistribution issues, environmental issues, cultural pluralism issues and trust in established institutions. By comparing this study with an equivalent study on young citizens in the city of Uppsala both similarities and differences, as regards to the spaces of position-takings, are uncovered suggesting that we are dealing with two somewhat different spaces: one space, the rural mining district, characterized by the working classes and one space, the city of Uppsala, characterized by the middle and upper middle classes, respectively.

The right that citizens have to formulate and propound political judgments is fundamental to the concept of democracy and democratic regimes. In theory democracy rests on citizens who are all equal, share equal rights to speak, act and judge politically. However, as Pierre Bourdieu demonstrates in a number of studies on political opinion the ability to produce a political opinion is unequally distributed, the propensity and ability to judge politically is rather a social competence beyond a mere technical competence. Using General Social Survey data from 2000-2006, the case of the United States is explored in Daniel Laurison's article "Political Competence in the United States". He shows that political competence—the sense of being a legitimate participant in politics—varies with social position. Those with lower volumes of capital are also less likely to give substantive answers to political questions, or to indicate that they feel politically efficacious. In "Educational and Social Dimensions of Political Participation: Producing a political opinion" Bergström focus on the social dimensions of political access, analyzing the so called "no-opinion" and "don't know" response's in a political questionnaire and the distribution of political practices. In conclusion political competence varies with educational qualifications, age, sex, social origin, and differs with place of residence and among other factors it also differs with character of the political issue. We can also conclude that the political landscape is structured by both volume and composition of capital. As such only parts of the population has the symbolic means to produce a political opinion, to access the political discourse and as such take part in the political culture.

Political Position-takings. The Case of Young Citizens in a Swedish Rural Mining District

Ylva Bergström & Tobias Dalberg

“Which social issue do you find most important today?” The question was asked in a questionnaire on political opinions conducted among upper secondary school students in the university town of Uppsala and the rural mining district of Bergslagen – two socially and geographically distinct places in Sweden. It is perhaps no surprise that the political issues that dominate among young people in the rural mining district differ from those in a relatively large university city. The respondents in Bergslagen were more inclined to specify issues within topics such as economics, equality, and migration than the respondents in Uppsala, who more frequently brought up justice, war and peace, and educational issues. It is how differences within the group of young citizens and their political orientation can be understood that is of central concern in this article. Studies of young citizens have had a tendency to focus on the younger generation’s different political orientation and their differing political acts.

It has become commonplace to argue that ‘post-materialist’ values have taken on greater importance in contemporary societies. A body of work in political science and sociology reveals how, first and foremost, younger generations in advanced industrial societies are acting in pursuit of goals that no longer have any direct relationship to economic security or prosperity, relating instead to the importance of affinity and aesthetic and intellectual needs (Inglehart 1971: 991-992, 1990: 66). The rising interest in human rights, animal rights, environmental and LGBT matters is meeting new demands that relate less to economic class conflicts than to socio-cultural identity and knowledge-related conflicts (Inglehart 1971, 1997, 2000: 221). While political conflicts are considered more concerned with the cultural sphere, socialization and issues other than economic scarcity/security, the relationship between social class and political attitudes and voting has become blurred (Flanagan 1987, Lipset & Clark 1991: 397, 403, Lipset et al 1994, Haber-

mas 1987: 391-396, 1997: 366-379). While some argue that social class has diminished as an explanatory factor for political orientation over the latter part of 20th century (Clark et al, 1993), others suggest that social class is still of vital concern to understanding the formation of individuals political party orientations and voting behavior in contemporary society. From a historical perspective Swedish political parties and left-right ideology in general have been rooted in social divisions in society (Hout et al. 1993, Holmberg & Oscarsson 2004: 141-162, Oscarsson 2005: 87, Svallfors 2006). A couple of recent studies from a Bourdieusian approach have revealed the correspondence between social position and political opinions and attitudes (Harrits et al, 2010; Enelo 2010, 2013).

This article *seeks to locate individuals in a space of political attitudes, interest, and opinions and analyze how different interests, opinions, and attitudes relate to one another*. What issues divide young citizens in the rural mining districts of Bergslagen and to what extent, and how, does the structure of related opinions, attitudes, and interests differ compared to the university town of Uppsala? We will argue that while socio-geographical conditions play a part in shaping political position-takings, the results discussed here also show that the space of position-takings displays a homology with social space – here indicated as social origin and educational position. By comparing the results of this study on political opinions in the rural mining district of Bergslagen with a similar study in the university town of Uppsala, we actually shed some light on the social conditions of political formations embedded in local contexts in a kind of detailed analysis that is given short shrift in international cross country value analysis.

What then characterizes Bergslagen as a region socially and geographically distinct from Uppsala? To begin with, we are dealing with rural versus urban. Uppsala is the fourth-largest city in Sweden and has a

strong academic tradition with its university founded in the 15th century, while Bergslagen is a region historically characterized by its mining industries. This becomes apparent when looking at the occupational composition of the labor markets in the two places. While there is an equal proportion of managerial positions in both Uppsala and Bergslagen, the proportion of the population in professional occupations such as physicians, dentists, teachers, etc., is more than twice as large in Uppsala as in Bergslagen. The inverse relationship prevails when it comes to manual labor occupations, especially the category of plant and machine operators, which is four times more common in Bergslagen than in Uppsala. In contrast to Uppsala, Bergslagen can thus be characterized by the high prevalence of working class occupations and the absence of professional occupations.

Taking these social conditions into account, the space of position-takings that will be constructed for Bergslagen reflects not only different spaces in a geographical perspective, but different spaces in terms of social strata. It is important to emphasize that the aim here is not primarily to investigate party choice but the space of consistent and conflicting position-takings – regardless of partisanship. Before constructing this space, a few words on the theoretical point of departure may be useful.

As stated above, this analysis is based on the sociology developed by French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. There are two main conceptual tools or ways of thinking about the social world that are significant to this article: the multidimensionality of the social world and the notion of political opinions and position-takings as position-takings in a space of *possible, thinkable, doable* position-takings; that is, the marketplace where the field of opinion-production meets the space of social positions. An individual's political opinion is, from this perspective, not a personal opinion but a product of the relationship between a specific political competence and a space of possible political position-takings. Bourdieu goes so far as to talk about these position-takings, especially in the form of political surveys, as a situation of supply and demand. The supply side here being the field of ideological production and the demand side being the social agents, equipped with a certain amount of political competence. This political competence gives the individual a sense of orientation in the field of possible political position-takings. Bourdieu defines this competence as a "capacity to recognize a political question as political and to treat it as such by responding to it politically, i.e., on the basis of specifically political principles" (Bourdieu, 1984: 399).

This article will not directly deal with the "field of ideological production," although the concept of field will form and frame the conditions for analysis. Since we are concerned with upper secondary school students, there will be a different take on these students' positions in the space of social class relations. The usual indicator positioning social class is occupational affinity, however since students do not yet have an occupation, social class is instead indicated by occupational affinity of their parents. In other words, what we are relating to here is more of an indicator of social origin than a social position. It is instead students' educational programs that function as an indicator of the students' present position in the social space. The system of Swedish upper secondary education is to a large extent characterized by social differences in recruitment to different schools and educational programs. In short, the choices of educational programs by children of different social origins takes on a structure resembling a triangle, with children of working class origin at the base and children of physicians, university teachers, and comparable occupations at the tip. Gender differences with regard to choice of educational program are largest among children of working class origin who are overrepresented in vocational programs, in effect creating a male pool and female pool of distant vocational programs. These differences diminish as one moves from the bottom base to the top point of the triangle where preparatory programs and natural science in particular position themselves and gender differences in recruitment have diminished (Broadly & Börjesson, 2008; Lidgran, 2009).

Political Spaces and Geometric Spaces

The use of factorial techniques to analyze political survey data is fairly well established. The method has for instance been used by sociologist Ronald Inglehart to analyze the shift from materialistic to post-materialistic lines of conflict (Inglehart, 1971). In this article, the theory and methods of Geometric Data Analysis (GDA) are employed. GDA and related methods including Correspondence Analysis (CA) are sometimes considered part of the family of factorial analysis, but GDA differs significantly in its emphasis on the geometric representation of data and the explanatory power confined within this geometric space; that is, the relations between the active elements.

GDA can be an appropriate set of tools to analyze political opinions and attitudes, as shown in a recent publication by Gitte Sommer Harrits et al (2010) where Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) was used to analyze class as a structuring factor of politi-

cal opinions and attitudes. But the tendency to use questions in a Likert scale format in political surveys can sometimes make the MCA less suitable since it produces a Guttman-effect, resulting in a one-dimensional representation of the opinions. A solution to this problem is to use doubled rates: recoding the

variables in a doubling technique that results in positive and negative variables. This technique was used by Brigitte Le Roux and Pascal Perrineau in their analysis of voting behavior in France (Le Roux & Perrineau, 2011). An example of the recoding is given in table 3 below.

Table 1. An example of recoding of variables using doubling technique

Raw responses	Doubled (recoded) variables	
	InterestedInEnvironmentalIssues_-	InterestedInEnvironmentalIssues_+
How interested are you in environmental issues?		
Very interested	0	4
Interested	1	3
Moderately interested	2	2
Not that interested	3	1
Not interested at all	4	0

The CA results in two clouds of points: one cloud for the rows and one cloud for the columns. In this particular case, where CA is applied to a table consisting of individuals \times variables with a doubling of variables, the procedure generates two clouds similar to the MCA procedure, with a cloud of individuals and a space of variables respectively. By employing the doubling technique, each row is given equal mass, thus providing meaning to the geometric concepts used to define and interpret the constructed space (Le Roux & Rouanet, 2004: 173-178).

Data and method

The data stem from a survey conducted among third-year pupils in upper secondary schools in Uppsala and Bergslagen in 2008. In total, there were 402 respondents from Bergslagen. A substantial part of the survey consisted of items concerning political attitudes, opinions, and practices from which a selection will form the basis of the construction of the space of position-takings.

Out of a total of 93 questions measuring political attitudes, opinions, and interests 24 questions were

selected based on their content and contribution to the constructed political space. These 24 questions are categorized in five thematically different subgroups covering the main topics of the contemporary political debate in Sweden (see table below). These questions also reflect some of the dimensions that have been identified or analyzed in the previous works on politics cited in this article (Ingelhart 1997, 2000, Holmberg & Oscarsson 2004). As evident, these questions do not reflect value priorities such as materialistic or post-materialistic, but are instead more focused on political matters. Moreover, the results of the analysis of these questions will not be directly comparable with Ingelhart's studies, although they should provide some scope for a comparative discussion. The same questions are used to analyze both the Uppsala and the Bergslagen cohort. However the selected questions are not particularly related to local issues, rather general questions discussed in contemporary public debate and recurring issue in national surveys (Bergström & Dalberg 2013).

Table 2. Questions used as active variables

Topic	<i>What is your opinion on...?</i>	<i>How interested are you in...?</i>
Liberal economy	Lowering the income tax Avoiding privatizing hospitals. Decreasing income inequality.	National economy Household economy
Cultural pluralism / Ethnocentrism	Accepting fewer refugees; Increasing economic support of cultural practices of immigrants Increasing support of native language development among immigrants	Foreign labor rights.
Environmental issues	Increasing fuel taxes to improve the environment Banning the private use of cars in cities Preserving nuclear power after 2010	Environmental issues Animal rights
Supra-nationality	Whether Sweden should join the EMU Whether Sweden should withdraw from the EU Whether the EU should be developed into a United States of Europe Whether Sweden should apply for NATO membership	Questions related to the EU
<i>How much do you trust the work of the following institutions?</i>		
Trust/confidence in established society and institutions	Government. Parliament. City Council. EU Parliament. Political parties.	

A sub-population was selected for the Correspondence Analysis (CA) on an individual \times variables table. The sub-population was selected based on the rate of no-opinion responses to the active questions. When this selection is not performed first, the principal axis is completely determined by the rate of no-opinion responses to the active questions. The selection criterion is motivated by the fact that the aim of CA is to investigate patterns of opinions and not whether or not the respondents have opinions. But this is more than a technical criterion: it can inherently be a sociological analysis of the propensity to produce an opinion. As shown in this issue by Bergström (2012) and Laurison (2012) respectively, this propensity varies with social origin and educational position (cf Bergström & Dalberg, 2013). But there is no linear relationship between social origin and response rate, which can be seen in the distribution in 11 different social groups before and after the selection of the sub-population. Table 5 shows that the distribution is relatively unchanged between the two populations. By using a somewhat different classification scheme for social groups in Table 2 compared to that used by

Statistics Sweden, the prevalence of working class occupations becomes even more distinct, with the majority originating from working class households.

The Space of Political Position-takings in Bergslagen

Starting with an analysis of our pre-constructed categories of questions and their contribution to the variance of the first three axes of the CA, it can be seen that, thematically, the first axis is dominated by questions on cultural pluralism/ethnocentrism and environmental issues. The second axis is dominated by questions on supra-nationality and trust in established institutions, and the third axis is dominated by questions on supra-nationality but also shows just-above-expected contributions from all other themes except trust in established institutions. The axes could also be analyzed by the type of questions contributing most. Position-takings on opinion questions dominate all three axes whereas position-takings on political interest questions contribute above average to axis 1 and 3 and position-takings on trust questions contribute above average on axis 2.

Table 3. Initial analyses of the first three axes of the CA

Theme	Axis 1	Axis 2	Axis 3	Type of question	Axis 1	Axis 2	Axis 3
Liberal economy	10.66	17.74	22.18	Interests	34.72	4.66	40.56
Cultural pluralism--ethnocentrism	33.25	1.16	23.24	Opinions	53.72	59.49	58.29
Environmental issues	36.98	6.65	22.95	Trust	11.57	35.85	1.15
Supra-nationality	7.54	38.60	30.49				
Trust in established institutions	11.57	35.85	1.15				
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	Total	100.00	100.00	100.00

While interpreting the space of position-takings it is important to emphasize that the positions are not absolute but relative to one another. The positions of the modalities for and against increased fuel tax are, for example, separated in space along the first axis, while those that cluster on the left in the figure are more inclined to be in favor of rather than opposed to an increased fuel tax. Keeping this in mind, the first principal axis, shown in figure 1, reveals the following oppositions: the left part gathers those who express interest in issues regarding the EU, environmental issues, animal rights, and foreign labor rights. It also gathers those who take a more positive position towards cultural pluralism – supporting mother tongue tuition and other kinds of cultural support to immigrant groups along with negative attitudes towards limits on refugee immigration. The left hand side also gathers those who are more negative to nuclear power and more negative towards lowering the income tax. This set of position-takings on different issues is opposed to that on the right hand side of figure 1, where all the opposing position-takings to those on the left side are positioned: i.e. positive attitudes towards a lowering income taxes and positive attitudes towards nuclear power; less interest in issues regarding the EU, environment, animal rights, and foreign labor rights; more positive to accepting fewer refugees and more negative towards cultural support to immigrants and mother tongue tuition.

The single most important variable on the first axis is whether or not the fuel tax should be increased. This indicates two things: firstly that this is an important issue in Bergslagen and secondly that this issue is controversial. However, the fuel tax issue unfolds a number of current meanings; from one point of view, access to reasonably priced gasoline or other fuels is more or less a prerequisite for rural living, from another it is first and foremost an environmental issue. The following quotation from an interview conducted in connection with the implementation of the survey, discloses the importance given to the issue of fuel taxes and to some extent also reveals the in-


trinsic tension involving environmental considerations and socioeconomic conditions.

Q: Which questions caught your attention? Can you explain in a bit more detail?

A: Yes, it's these job issues. Will I ever get a job? And if I do, under what conditions...under what conditions I will work, what salary and so forth. Then there is my mom too, she has to travel a far distance to work. She's a nurse and works nights sometimes. It's expensive to drive back and forth to work and she doesn't earn that much... Of course I'm aware of this concern with the environment and so on, it is easy to raise prices on gas and diesel, but then it affects us who have no other alternative and it still wouldn't solve the climate issue, no one could make me believe that. For me, the car is... the freedom to go to work, to shop wherever you want, being able to go visit friends, not having to adjust to a schedule, to the local bus schedule ... Being able to drive is a human right too, ...at least for us who live here in the countryside, not in Stockholm or other big cities. That's an issue that concerns me. (Male student, Vehicle program, VBU)

In summary the primary polarities on the first axis, juxtaposed to the opposition to higher fuel taxes, are characterized by antagonism between ethnocentrism and cultural pluralism combined with environmental issues. While traditional "old" political issues of economic redistribution are absent (except for the opposing standpoints on high income taxes and to some extent the question of fuel tax, which could be interpreted as an economic issue as well as an environmental one), the 'new' socio-cultural political issues divide the space of political orientation in antagonistic distant positions. A position against immigration, tax-funded mother tongue tuition and related negative attitudes to immigrants' cultural support is distant to more liberal and egalitarian attitudes towards ethno-pluralism. The further question is how it is possible to understand this formation of standpoints.

Figure 1. The space of political position-takings. Cloud of active variables. The plane of axis 1 and 2. Variables contributing over average to the first axis.




The second axis, as noted above, is primarily structured around themes of trust and supra-nationality. As shown in figure 2, the postures towards these issues are closely related. For instance, trust in established institutions such as parliament or government corresponds to more positive positions towards membership in the EU, EMU, and NATO. Such trustful dispositions towards political institutions are positioned in the upper part of figure 2, where one also finds, apart from those modalities already mentioned, trust in the EU Parliament, a positive attitude towards making EU into a United States of Europe as well as positive position-taking towards nuclear power and lowering high income tax (modalities also important on the first axis).

In the lower part of figure 2, we can recognize the opposing positions towards those in the upper part. Here, a less trustful disposition towards government, parliament and the EU Parliament is coupled with more negative positions towards the EU, membership in the EMU and NATO, as well as more negative position-takings on nuclear power and lowering the income tax rate.

The close correspondence between trust and dispositions towards supra-nationality indicates that these are intertwined issues; obviously distrust in national and European political institutions is closely related to reluctance towards the EU and developed European integration and resistance towards the EMU.

Figure 2. The space of political position-takings. Cloud of active variables. The plane of axis 1 and 2. Variables contributing over average to the second axis.



The third axis is more or less a combination of axis 1 and 2 and will not be subjected to a detailed analysis. Instead it is the complete space of position-takings that will be discussed. The combination of figure 1 and figure 2 constructs the most important aspects of this space of position-takings (cf. figure 3). This is a space that reflects a number of things. Above all, it is a representation of relations between different position-takings among upper secondary students in the Bergslagen mining district. The issues creating polarities on axis one and two constitutes the space of position-takings. The way they are organized according to proximities and distances points to the conclusion that some positions and dispositions are indeed incompatible. It would, for instance, considering the space of political opinions in Bergslagen, be a rather conflict-


ing combination of political postures to take a position against cultural pluralism on the one hand and a position for an environmentalist approach, on the other.

Secondly, this space of position-takings, by virtue of its empirical object, is obviously a particular case. However, by treating it as a *particular case of possible* position takings among young Swedish citizens using a comparative method: a particular place at a particular time, under particular social conditions, and using a particular survey with a particular set of questions, the singularity of the object does not preclude drawing on some general propositions. It can be argued that the opinions, attitudes, and interests presented in the political space are in fact indicators of what kind of issues are being debated in contempo-

rary Swedish political discourse. It could even be argued that this constructed space is a phenomenological construction of the space of political position-takings as it appears to those entering this space. Whether or not there has been a shift in some general public opinion or of political conflict lines, as has been the focus in previous studies by Inglehart and the body of work referred to as the world value survey, the constructed political space reveals a pattern of political opinions and interests that is structured by both old traditional and new political dimensions (cf Harrits et al 2010: 10-12, Bergström & Dalgren 2013). Regardless of any shift, the space constructed is still a space of different conflict lines and positions relative to one another as perceived by those who are in the space.

Thirdly, the language used to describe the constructed space of position-takings, using words of probabilistic nature rather than absolutes, derives from the possibility that this space is not just a representation of different position-takings but a representation of different dispositions in Bourdieu's sense of the term. It is perhaps more accurate to speak of positions in the left hand part of the space as dispositions towards position-takings more related to those positions, than to simply speak of different position-takings. And as dispositions are related to positions in the social space, the next section will analyze the relation between political dispositions and social and educational positions of the students. This will be done with the use of hierarchical clustering on the geometrically constructed space.


Figure 3. Diagram of the space of position-takings in Bergslagen



Euclidean clustering of the space of political position-takings

Using an ascending hierarchical clustering of the individual coordinates on the first three axes, a hierarchical system of partitions into clusters is the result of agglomerating individuals geometrically close to one another. The clustering process starts from the bottom, so to speak, by grouping the individuals closest to one another in pairs and continues until all individuals are in the same cluster. But when interpreting this hierarchical nesting of clusters we start from the top and the first partition into two clusters. As one follows the cluster tree from the top to the bottom the within-variance decreases and the between-variance increases, meaning that the amount of variance attributable to differences between clusters rises.

Figure 4. Clustering tree with partitions 1, 2, and 3 into 2, 3, and 4 clusters, respectively represented by the horizontal lines in the figure




The third partition into four clusters A, C, E, and F, is the retained solution of the cluster analysis for two reasons. Firstly, it is the first partition where the between-variance exceeds the within-variance. Of the variance of the cloud of individuals on axes 1, 2 and 3, 55 percent is attributable to the between-variance between the four clusters (cf. Le Roux & Rouanet, 2004: : 114-115). Secondly, the solution proves to be sociologically interpretable with four distinct orientations in the space of position-takings. These four clusters can be said, in relation to the analysis of the space in the preceding section, to represent four (broad) sets of dispositions regarding political position-takings. This illustrates the multidimensional character of the space in that the multidimensional

structure is present both in the space as a whole and in each cluster. Cluster A, for instance, is characterized by its location relative to other clusters in several dimensions. Based on their respective orientations, the clusters may be labeled as follows:

- Radical-right, distrust in political institutions (cluster A);
- Left-wing orientation, affirming cultural pluralism (cluster C);
- EU orientation (cluster E);
- General interest in political issues, and trust in political institutions (cluster F).

Figure 4. The space of political position-takings. Cloud of individuals. The plane of axis 1 and 2. Projection of the third partition into four clusters



To begin with, the radical-right cluster is located in the lower right part of the space of position-takings. Low interest in political issues combined with low trust in established institutions is one of the main features. There is also strong approval of the opinion that Sweden should limit the numbers of refugees as well as a strong inclination to defend the preservation of nuclear power. Coupled with negative attitudes towards the EU, EMU, and NATO, this cluster of position-takings is characterized by a tendency to advocate a Swedish exit from the EU. There is also a strong position against income equality, along with position-takings affirming lower taxes on high income and against a ban on privatizing hospitals.

These four clusters are not only representations of different orientations in the space of position-takings; they also reflect different social positions. In this case, the radical-right cluster (A) is characterized by an overrepresentation of male students in vocational study programs of working class origin. In grouping different social origins a distinction was made between the relatively large group of industrial workers on the one hand and other working class professions such as construction workers, transportation workers, etc. This distinction does not only stem from the composition in our population. It also reflects differences in organizations where, on the one hand, we have industrial workers in large industrial companies where employees now and historically are organized in unions and, on the other hand, occupations that are known to be organized in self-employment, small businesses, and what one might call entrepreneurial organizations. This distinction relates to different dispositions towards the space of possible political position-takings, as for instance the overrepresentation of sons of construction and transportation workers in the radical right cluster, characterized by antipathy towards immigrants, resistance to redistribution of common goods, income equality, and support for lower taxes on high income. Empirical research clearly indicates that workers and the old middle classes are overrepresented among radical right supporters (Lubbers et al 2002: 364, Invarsfalten 2005: 465, Norris 2005: 139). Social marginality has become more important over time to explain voter support of the populist Sweden Democrats party and the established radical right populist parties in Sweden (Rydgren & Ruth 2011: 217, 222-223, Oscarsson & Demker 2012: 177-189). However, several researchers emphasize that the formation of radical-right political orientation is not adequately understood in terms of social class structures, emphasizing instead a lack of higher education (Oscarsson & Demker 2012,

Rydgren & Ruth 2011: 208, Rydgren 2012: 1-3, cf Evans 2005). Such conclusions tend to forget or fail to recognize that differences in educational level and or educational career at a given moment are the scholastic translation of differences in social origin (Bourdieu 1984: 421). The choice of educational path, the choice of educational program, discipline, and career express the ambitions that are available to individuals with a given social origin and academic heritage. The cluster of radical right position-takings is overrepresented among sons of working class origin, young men in vocational programs, such as automotive, construction, and electrician programs. These are social groups dispossessed in terms of educational assets and preparing for a challenging (local) labor market, a work sector that is shrinking and/or exposed to competition in the global market.

The (egalitarian) left-wing oriented cluster C, located in the lower left part of the space of position-takings, is characterized by positive attitudes towards economic redistribution, expressed by a generally favorable stance on income equality, antipathy towards private, for-profit operation of hospitals, and strong overrepresentation of position-takings against lowering high income taxes. This is also a cluster of positions affirming cultural support of immigrant groups, opposing limits on refugees, interest in foreign labor rights and environmental issues, resistance towards private use of cars cities, advocating higher fuel taxes, and opposing nuclear power. This economic redistribution and orientation, intertwined with egalitarian positions towards immigrant groups and interest in environmental issues is combined with lack of trust in established national and transnational institutions. This left-wing cluster of position-takings (C) includes an overrepresentation of female students in preparatory educational programs of working class and cultural middle class origin. The cultural middle class consists mostly of (sons and) daughters of teachers.

The EU-oriented cluster (E) is characterized by a marked resistance towards increased connectedness among the European states, and lack of interest in foreign labor rights. This cluster also includes positions affirming for-profit provision of social and health services, ambivalent trust in national and international political institutions coupled with distrust of the local community council. Within this cluster of position-takings, sons of industrial workers and sons of cultural middle class origin are overrepresented. Neither preparatory nor vocational programs are overrepresented.

The cluster of general political interest has a weak orientation towards post-materialist issues and gathers interest in animal rights and environmental issues. This cluster also leans slightly towards an EU-orientation as well as a left-wing orientation located in the upper left-hand side of the political space of position-takings. Gathered in this cluster (F) we recognize an overrepresentation of women, students in preparatory study programs, and economic and cultural middle class origin.

These clusters of position-takings unveil a quite distinct gender division. On the left-hand side, women are overrepresented in clusters of left-wing oriented position-takings and clusters of general interest in politics, most significantly in post-materialist issues in the upper left hand corner, and environmental issues and animal rights and, in the lower left-hand corner, foreign labor rights. On the opposite right-hand side, the radical-right cluster in the lower corner gathers an overrepresentation of men of working class origin.

Finally, the left-wing cluster F resembles to some extent the emphasis on redistribution found in cluster C. But this cluster of position-takings differs in the sense that there is a much broader or 'general' interest in political issues and gathers those who have trust in national and transnational political institutions. Although cluster E and F resemble each other, the economic redistribution and environmentalist orientation are not distinguished position-takings represented in cluster E.

Conclusions

By reviewing the composition regarding different social properties in each cluster, it is obvious that the radical right cluster (A) stands in stark contrast to almost everything from the other three clusters of position-takings. While this is a reasonable conclusion given that cluster A resulted from the first partition, it is striking that this cluster shows such deviance, on the social attributes as well. The clustering was, after all, performed on basis of response patterns on political opinions and not on social attributes. This simultaneous appearance of deviance in two conceptually distinct spaces – the space of position-takings and the space of social attributes – leads to an interpretation of the space of position-takings as follows: the different sets of position-takings, or even dispositions, make up the differentiating principles in the space of position-takings; coincidentally these differentiating principles exist because this space is homologous to the space of social properties, hence evoking the homology thesis of Pierre Bourdieu (2010/1979, pp. 171ff). The basic conclusion of this article is that

social origin and educational positions – social class – structure political position-takings and interest, although in complex ways. Class structures and structures of political conflicts are changing; however complexities in the political landscape seem to be underpinned by a complexity in social structure.

The results presented in this article are similar to those found in the study of upper secondary students in Uppsala, but there are also differences. Issues of economic redistribution contribute far less to the differentiation in the political space of Bergslagen than in Uppsala, and conversely environmental issues contribute much more to the differentiation in Bergslagen than in Uppsala. We must keep in mind that in comparison with Uppsala, a relatively larger number of respondents in Bergslagen specified the economy as the most important social issue. Although the economy is identified as an important issue it does not divide young people's political position-takings in any striking way. In Bergslagen, which is by nature an industrial society, there is quite a strong awareness, for instance, of the impact of the global economy on local industries, but it is more an awareness shared among young people in Bergslagen than an issue that divides social groups of young people. Bergslagen differs from Uppsala in the sense that Uppsala is characterized by a higher degree of social differentiation than Bergslagen. Social groups with a relatively high amount of cultural capital and those with a relatively high amount of economic capital are more or less absent in Bergslagen. These groups were overrepresented in opposing positions on redistribution issues in Uppsala. The dominating distribution of difference in Bergslagen is revealed in relation to issues on cultural pluralism, dispositions towards refugees and immigrant groups with a corresponding gender division, separating students in preparatory educational programs from students in vocational educational programs and students with a working class origin from students with a cultural middle class social origin. Taking the changing structure of the political landscape into account, it is interesting to note that it is along new political dimensions, identity politics and socio-cultural issues, that we discern a proletarianization of the radical right-wing orientation.

In summary, the spaces of position-takings in Bergslagen and Uppsala represent two slightly different parts of a much wider space of position-takings. As outlined in figure 5 below, if we project the political space of young citizens in Bergslagen onto the space of political position-takings in Uppsala, or vice versa, the center of the space of Bergslagen is posi-

tioned slightly below the center of the space of Uppsala. The positions and compositions of social attributes in each space relative to one another suggests that we are dealing with a space characterized by the working classes and a space characterized by the middle and upper middle classes, respectively.

A sizeable proportion of young people in Bergslagen have a positive attitude towards the EU, simultaneously harboring antipathy towards more extensive collaboration among EU Member States. Bergslagen might differ from Uppsala in the sense that EU policy and related issues have more tangible everyday political consequences and are possibly also more apparent in local policy in Bergslagen than in Uppsala. Since the late 1980s the rural communities in Bergslagen have been challenged by structural transformation as the economic crises forced the steel and forestry industries to institute substantial efficiency measures. This transformation of Bergslagen has been and remains heavily dependent on 'structural funds,' financed initially by the Swedish state and subsequently by the EU.¹ Young students' orientation towards the EU is reasonably related to local experience and the sense of dependence on government and EU funding.

Despite the rather different compositions of social attributes in the two spaces, the structural similarity is obvious. The attempted explanation to this structural similarity is hypothetical and introduces the concept of field. It is our belief that the structures of political position-takings are so similar in two very distinct geographical places because what we call 'political' and 'political issues' are not a production of the individual subjects' considerations, but have already been produced in a hypothetical field of ideological production. The space constructed in this article is merely a market for the appropriation of political 'goods,' that is, available or possible standpoints. The structural similarity between two rather different settings could be an indication that this "marketplace" is homologous to a field of ideological production.

Ylva Bergström

Docent (Associate Professor), Sociology of education.
ylva.bergstrom@edu.uu.se

Tobias Dalberg

Magister (Master of Arts), Sociology of education.
tobias.dalberg@edu.uu.se

Abstract


The aim of this article is to explore and understand young rural citizens' political position-takings. By employing a Bourdieusian approach to class and politics, we are able to show class still offers an important tool for understanding differing political position-takings. By comparing this study carried out on a population from a rural mining district with an equivalent study on young citizens in the city of Uppsala we find both similarities and differences as regards the spaces of position-takings. Both spaces are structured by oppositions regarding redistribution issues, environmental issues, cultural pluralism issues and trust in established institutions, but these different issues are of different importance in each geographical setting. In summary, the spaces of position-takings in Bergslagen and Uppsala represent two slightly different parts of a much wider space of position-takings. The positions and compositions of social attributes in each space relative to one another suggests that we are dealing with one space, the rural mining district, characterized by the working classes and one space, the city of Uppsala, characterized by the middle and upper middle classes, respectively.

Keywords

Young citizens, Politics, Position-takings, Class, Geometric Data Analysis

¹ EU structural funds and the first 'Bergslagen Mission' aimed at business innovation and entrepreneurship (30%), education (8.6%) and communications (7%), cultural projects (4%). (The Västergötland package was primary intended for educational interventions and cultural projects)

Figure 5. Uppsala and Bergslagen spaces of position-takings synchronized



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Appendix – tables

Table 1. Which societal issue do you find most important today? Open-ended answers categorized. Relative frequencies in Bergslagen and Uppsala respectively.

	Bergslagen (N=402)	Uppsala (N=1097)
Economy	13,7	8,1
Equality	7,5	3,9
Environment	20,6	22,8
Justice	0,7	2,8
Peace & conflict	1,2	3,1
Migration	6,5	4,9
Education	1,0	2,1
Healthcare	1,5	0,7
Law & Justice	1,2	1,8
Rights	2,7	2,3
Other Issues	5,7	3,8
Don't know and no response	37,6	43,6
Total	100,0	100,0

Table 2. Distribution in different occupations in Uppsala and Bergslagen 2010. ISCO-88 groups. Source: Statistics Sweden (SCB).

ISCO-88 Groups	Bergslagen (N=20 462)	Uppsala
Managers	5,2	5,4
Professionals	12,0	25,4
Technicians and associate professionals	15,7	19,3
Clerical support workers	5,4	7,3
Service and sales workers	19,4	20,6
Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers	0,9	0,7
Craft and related trades workers	11,5	7,2
Plant and machine operators, and assemblers	20,1	4,9
Elementary occupations	6,1	5,2
Armed forces occupations/NA	3,7	3,9
Total	100,0	100,0

Table 3. Social origin in the Bergslagen population and sub-population selected for Correspondence Analysis (CA).

Bergslagen	Population		CA-population	
11 professional groups, extracted from household	N	%	n	%
Civil engineers	8	2,0	3	1,6
Physicians	0	0,0	0	0,0
Professors, upper secondary teachers	2	0,5	2	1,0
CEOs	2	0,5	2	1,0
Senior officials	4	1,0	1	0,5
Technicians	24	6,0	15	7,9
Compulsory school teachers	17	4,2	10	5,2
Art producers	1	0,2	1	0,5
Officials	31	7,7	15	7,9
Small entrepreneurs	38	9,5	22	11,5
Workers	226	56,2	105	55,0
N/A	49	12,2	15	7,9
Total	402	100,0	191	100,0

Table 4. Characterizing modalities for clusters in partition 1 to 3.²

Partition (percent between-variance) Variable label Cluster label		Characterizing modalities								
		Partition 1 (26,3)		Partition 2 (44,4)			Partition 3 (55,0)			
		A	B	A	C	D	A	C	E	F
Income equality		--	++	--	++	+ -	--	++	+ -	+
Interest in domestic economics		--	+ -	--	+ -	+	--	+ -	-	+
Interest in national economics		--	+	--	+ -	+	--	+ -	-	+
Lower high income tax		+	-	+	-	+ -	+	-	+ -	+ -
Ban private hospital profit		--	+	--	++	+ -	--	++	--	+
Cultural support to immigrants		-	+ -	-	+	+ -	-	+	-	+ -
Interest in foreign labor rights		--	+ -	--	++	+ -	--	++	--	+ -
Accept fewer refugees		++	-	++	-	+	++	-	+	+
Support to mother tongue tuition		-	+	-	--	+	-	--	+ -	+
Increase taxes on fuel		-	+ -	-	+	+ -	-	+	-	+
Interest in animal rights		--	+	--	++	+	--	++	-	+
Interest in environmental issues		--	+	--	++	+	--	++	+ -	+
Preserve nuclear power		++	-	++	-	+ -	++	-	--	-
Stop private motoring in cities		--	++	--	++	+ -	--	++	-	+
EMU membership		-	++	-	-	++	-	-	+ -	--
Interest in EU issues		--	+ -	--	-	+ -	--	-	-	+ -
Make EU into a United States		-	+ -	-	-	+ -	-	-	--	+
NATO membership		--	+ -	--	-	+ -	--	-	+ -	+ -
Sweden should exit EU		++	-	++	+	-	++	+	-	-
Trust in communal council		--	+	--	+ -	+	--	+ -	-	+
Trust in EU parliament		--	+	--	-	+	--	-	+ -	+
Trust in political parties		--	+ -	--	-	+ -	--	-	+ -	+
Trust in Swedish government		--	+ -	--	-	+	--	-	+ -	+
Trust in Swedish parliament		--	+ -	--	-	+	--	-	+ -	+

Table 5. Distribution of gender, educational position and social origin in four clusters (partition 3).

		Clusters (%)				
	N	A	C	E	F	Total
<i>Gender</i>						
Women	95	27,0	63,3	40,0	61,6	49,5
Men	96	73,0	36,7	60,0	38,4	50,5
Total	190 ³	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0
<i>Educational program</i>						
Preparatory	127	29,7	76,7	68,6	79,5	66,5
Vocational	64	70,3	23,3	31,4	20,5	33,5
Total	191	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0
<i>Social Origin</i>						
Industrial workers	51	29,7	26,7	33,3	20,5	26,7
Other working class occupations	54	35,1	30,0	23,5	27,4	28,3
Economic middle class	37	16,2	16,7	15,7	24,7	19,4
Cultural middle class	34	8,1	20,0	19,6	20,5	17,8
Unemployed/NA	15	10,8	6,7	7,8	6,8	7,9
Total	191	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

² Usually one uses the mean for comparisons when dealing with ratings or doubled rates. But for a Likert scale transformed into doubled ratings with 4 points it is not reasonable to make a comparison of means based on standard deviations. It is then better to characterize the clusters by characterizing modalities.

³ One respondent did not state gender.

Educational and Social Dimensions of Political Participation: *Producing a political opinion*

Ylva Bergström

Introduction

Q: Is there any political issue that you find interesting today?

A: I'm not interested in politics and I am actually totally uninvolved. I wouldn't want to join and participate in a political party or anything like that. You get upset about a lot of things... things that make me angry. But that's not the same as getting involved..." (Female student, upper secondary school, child care program).

Q: What upsets you?

A: Violence and things like that, destructiveness, affect me a lot...no one seems to do anything about it. Of course I see the environmental issues, which are always a topic of discussion. Of course it's important, but what can you do? I just don't know what to do about it. Some people say we need to change our lifestyles, but I for one can't save the climate: maybe if I had more knowledge, if I was better informed. (Female student, upper secondary school, child care program).

Q: Is there any political issue that you find interesting today?

A: Rwanda, Darfur, Sudan, Western Sahara ... human rights, international law, and international issues are what interests me. There are serious conflicts in the world; the worst thing is the fact that Western societies don't respond or react...We have witnessed conflicts that lasted a very long time before it became an issue for the UN for instance. In Darfur, China vetoed the question when it finally became a matter of UN troops, and one reason that China vetoed the resolution is that China gets its oil from Sudan and Darfur. In Sweden, we have a long tradition of taking a stand for

human rights, but these days, quite to the contrary, Sweden is playing a less important, or reticent, role, in world peace and conflict issues. And Swedish development assistance is decreasing. However, in the case of Western Sahara, Sweden did take a stand and held that the UN needed to act in order to resolve the conflict and we voted against the fisheries agreement between the EU and Morocco concerning fishing in the waters off Western Sahara. It was a great moment, Sweden was the only country to stand up and oppose the agreement. (Male upper secondary student, science program)

The question was asked in interviews of third-year upper secondary students in a survey on political opinions conducted in the university town of Uppsala and the rural mining district of Bergslagen 2008-2009.¹ The quoted responses illustrate a wide difference in the probability of being interested in politics or declaring an interest in politics and speaking out politically. The above quotations only, or primarily, reveal a difference in which interest in politics is opposed to lack of interest or indifference and commitment is opposed to non-commitment. The quotations illustrate a difference when it comes to verbosity and language skills and the related statements also show a difference in trust or confidence in the respondents' own ability to imagine the political and deal with political issues: to speak and judge politically. In the first quotation, political issues seem out of reach in one way or another. While the second quotation, from the very first sentence, indicates that the respondent has a good grasp of politics and that poli-

¹ The survey comprised 40 interviews (25 in Uppsala and 15 in Bergslagen) and a questionnaire completed by a total of 1,499 respondents (402 in Bergslagen and 1,097 in Uppsala).

tics is of great concern to him. The respondent speaks as though he knows that he understands political issues. He is speaking as someone who is not only confident in his own ability, but also can allow himself to evaluate the political situation and the state of Swedish foreign policy: "It was a great moment; Sweden was the only country to stand up and oppose the agreement." The quotations may also be considered approaches to politics from different educational positions. The first quotation was expressed by a female student in a vocational program while the second was expressed by a male student in a university-preparatory science program, both in Swedish upper secondary schools.² How can such differences be understood? To whom does politics seem to be of concern and to whom is it simply pointless to engage and participate in (any kind of) political activity?

Decline in civic engagement, declining voter turnouts, and growing lack of trust in political institutions have on the whole been of great concern in social science in recent decades (Dalton 1998, Norris 1999; 2002, Putnam 2000).³ Specifically in Sweden, young people's tendency to refrain from political participation, abstentions in political elections by first-time voters, and the decline in party affiliation among younger generations have been troubling issues in recent years. At the same time a growing body of research has shed light on increasing participation in alternative channels to political participation (Wennerhag 2006, Amnå 2008, Amnå & Ekman 2013, Stolle, Hooghe, Micheletti 2005). Much of this scholarly interest in changing political participation and engagement focuses on intergenerational differences, which may obscure differences in political interest and engagement among youth as a group.

Whereas previous analysis of political position-takings revealed distance and proximity between varying political interests and opinions and the correspondence between the space of political position-takings and educational positions and social origins (Bergström & Dalberg 2013), this article centers on

difference and similarities in political participation among young people. The analysis focuses first on the educational and social dimensions of all "don't know" and "no opinion" responses to political questions in the aforementioned survey on political opinions, interests, and attitudes, and secondly on civic engagement and a wide range of political participation such as joining political parties or special interest groups, participating in political acts, and the propensity to read a newspaper, whether a national daily paper, a local paper, or an evening paper, and to what extent the opinion or arts pages attract different groups of students in upper secondary school.

"Don't know" responses and variations

As our previous analysis centered around the position holders, in the following we will take a different tack and identify those who rarely or never position themselves in politics (Bergström & Dalberg 2013). It is well-established in political science and psephology that a percentage of the population in surveys and opinion polls will decline to answer political questions and that this "non-response" varies with age, sex, educational level, occupation, etc. Further attempts to understand the relationship between social positions and ways of relating to political action – even in the most rudimentary way, by producing a response to a political question by checking a pre-formulated response – are, however, rarely analyzed.⁴

The probability of formulating a political opinion appears unequally distributed, as is the probability of producing a response to a politically constituted question (cf Bourdieu, 1993, 1984: 397-465)⁵. In a survey on political interests and attitudes conducted among third-year pupils in upper secondary schools in Uppsala and Bergslagen in 2008, male students are overrepresented among those who responded to all political questions as well as among those who responded to none or only one of the political questions. Thus, female students responded less often to the political questions (38.2%) compared to male students (49.5%), but a larger percentage of male students (21.4%) than female students (16.9%) rarely or never responded to any of the questions on political opinion in the questionnaire.⁶ However, these gender differ-

² The interviews stem from a survey conducted among Swedish upper secondary students in the academic town of Uppsala and four small towns in the mining district of Bergslagen: Grängesberg, Ludvika, Smedjebacken (VBU), and Fagersta (NVU). The survey consisted of 30 interviews and a questionnaire with 1,499 respondents (1,097 in Uppsala and 402 in Bergslagen). This article focuses on political practices and is based on previous analysis of the space of position-takings.

³ Voter turnout peaked in 1979 at 91.8% of the electorate. Since then, voter turnouts steadily declined until the 2006 election when turnout fell just below 82%. During this period, participation in the most traditional political activities declined as well (Holmberg & Oscarsson 2004). Voter turnout increased slightly in 2010 to 84.6% of the electorate (Svenskt valdeltagande under hundra år, SCB, Statistics Sweden.)

⁴ In this issue Daniel Laurisson (2012) specifically analyzes the patterns of abstention in the 2004 election in the United States probing the (social) status sense of being entitled to act politically.

⁵ This is also a reason why Bourdieu criticized the concept of public opinion, unraveling its misleading consequences in the article *Public Opinion Does Not Exist*, first published in 1972 (see Bourdieu 1979:124-130).

⁶ The questions on political opinions were designed with preformulated answers to which the respondents were asked to choose

ences vary between groups of students and the wider gaps between the sexes in non-response rates appear among students in vocational programs. The differences between the sexes among students in preparatory programs are smaller.

The probability of producing an answer or opinion to political questions or statements also rises as one moves from students in vocational programs to students in preparatory programs, reaching the highest rates in the social science programs, closely followed by students in science programs. Students with more abundant educational resources tend to be more likely to produce a response than those with less abundant educational resources and the lowest response rate is found among students in vocational programs: 38.5 percent of students in male-dominated automotive programs; 34.5 percent of students in electricity and construction programs; and 31.8 percent of students in female-dominated health-care and social service programs rarely or never respond to political questions.

In a similar vein, response rates for politically constituted questions vary as we move through the social hierarchy, rising as we move from students of working class origin to students of upper middle class origin. As shown in Table 1, the sons and daughters of parents in lower level service professions such as vocational nurses and retail workers, as well as industrial workers and farmers, and students whose parents work in construction and transport respond far less often to politically constituted questions than do sons and daughters of parents who are teachers, doctors, or scientists.

The inert “don’t know” category or “no opinion” responses vary not only, as noted, according to the properties of the respondent but also to the nature of the question. The rate of “no opinion” and “don’t know” responses varies within the same survey from one question to the next. To begin with, we find that the rate of “no opinion” responses varies from foreign policy questions and purely political issues to questions that elicit an ethical response to the most mundane issues and/or problems of everyday life. Overall, the number of “no opinion” answers increased significantly when respondents were asked to give their opinion (agree/disagree)⁷ on statements such as: “Reduce the political influence of financial markets” (52.8%); “Aid to developing countries should be equal to 1% of GDP” (48.1%) or “The EU should develop into a United States of Europe” (45.8%). The

level of abstention was substantially lower when respondents were asked to “agree” or “disagree” with the statements: “Lower taxes on high income” (24.3%); “Restrict the right to free abortion” (22.3%), and “Homosexual couples should be given the same rights as heterosexual couples to adopt a child” (22.1%). Taken together, the rate of abstention or “no opinion” response varies in relation to both the properties of the respondent *and* the properties of the question. When the question deals with daily life, ethics, or household morality such as “Restrict the right to free abortion” and “Homosexual couples should be given the same rights as heterosexual couples to adopt a child,” the gap narrows between groups of students in vocational and preparatory programs. The propensity to produce a political opinion not only rises when we move from vocational to preparatory programs and from students of working class origin to upper (cultural) middle class origin, the gap between these positions increases as the question becomes more abstract and detached from everyday experience and depending on the degree to which the question is constructed in a specific political science style, that is, both in subject and in wording.

Thus the probability of response depends in each of these cases on the *relationship* between the two dimensions of properties; between the properties of the question (defined by its nature, remoteness from experience, degree of abstraction and attachment to common realities in subject and language) and the respondents’ properties (sex, educational position, social origin, place) (cf Bourdieu 1984:405-406). In a similar vein, the likelihood of participating in political activities varies with the nature of the act and the properties of the respondent. As with producing a response to a questionnaire on politics, the propensity to join a political party, a political interest group, participate in a public demonstration, sign a petition, contact an elected official, or the propensity to read a newspaper and especially particular sections of the paper lay bare social disparities and differences between students in different educational positions. However, political acts are also intertwined with the structure of political orientations. In the following, we have projected “supplementary variables” – indicating political activities – onto a space of political position-taking among students in upper secondary school in Uppsala (Bergström & Dalberg 2013). The aim here is to enrich the interpretation of the correspondence analysis of political orientations among young students (Le Roux & Rouanet 2004: 254). This supplementary analysis not only sheds light on the probability of being politically active among students in

among “Fully agree,” “Agree somewhat,” “Do not really agree,” “Totally disagree,” and “No opinion.”

⁷ The preformulated answers ranged from “Fully agree” to “Do not agree at all” and “No opinion.”

upper secondary school, more to the point it reveals the differences that can be discerned between holders of differing political positions and thus students in different educational positions and of different social origins.

Political activities and civic engagement

The space of political position-takings among students in Uppsala is mainly structured in three dimensions (Bergström & Dalberg 2013).⁸ Figure 1 presents the distribution of political activities, membership in various kinds of associations, and newspaper consumption added as supplementary variables in the constructed space of position-takings, in this case the plane of axis 1 and 2 (the first two dimensions). The horizontal axis 1 is structured by opposing opinions on redistribution, cultural pluralism, and environmental issues where a left-wing orientation on the left-hand side is juxtaposed with a liberal right-wing orientation on the right-hand side. The vertical axis 2 is constructed by different positions towards trust in established political institutions and attitudes towards Swedish membership in the EU and EU policy, where the established trusters in the upper part of the figure are opposed to the distrustful positions in the lower part of Figure 1, juxtaposing those who favor Swedish EU membership and are interested in EU-policy from position-takings against Swedish EU membership and indifference or lack of interest in EU policy.

At first glance, we find an overrepresentation of members in politically related associations and political activities in the upper level of the chart in Figure 1, especially on the left-hand side. It is also in this area, the upper left part of the chart, that we find an overrepresentation of those who read the newspapers' opinion, editorial, and foreign news pages along with the arts pages. On the right hand side of the graph we find an overrepresentation of readers of the financial. Consumers of financial pages reside among those who hold liberal-right political positions, whereas consumers of arts pages are juxtaposed to liberal-left position-takings and positions that favor cultural pluralism, environmental protection, etc.

The distribution of political practices and newspaper consumption corresponds with the structure of political position-takings in two striking ways. First,

we find the multimembers among those who are inclined to position themselves. Members of associations and organizations, as well as participants in various activities are mainly concentrated among the position holders along horizontal axis 1, among students who respond to questions and position themselves in relation to issues of redistribution, environmental protection, and cultural pluralism. Secondly, differences in memberships, activities, and newspaper readership correspond to the structure of opposing opinions along the first horizontal axis 1. For instance, we find an overrepresentation of those responding that they participated in public demonstrations several times on the left-hand side of horizontal axis 1, closely related to left-wing political position-takings, interests in environmental issues, and egalitarian attitudes towards immigrants. In this area of the graph we also find an overrepresentation of those organized in international human rights, human aid and environmental organizations (cf table 1 appendix). In the opposite area of the graph where the liberal-right wing position-takings are situated we find an overrepresentation of those that responded with more reluctant attitudes towards public demonstrations (no response to public demonstration). Public demonstrations are not solely associated with the labor movement. Feminist, environmental, and LGBT movements have successively been associated with public acts and demonstration with the advent of relatively new forms of political action: political activism; political consumerism; and discursive political actions (Micheletti, Follesdal & Stolle 2003, Micheletti & Stolle 2004, Amnå 2013).⁹

⁸ The first dimension is constituted by opposing opinions on redistribution, cultural pluralism, and environmental issues. The second dimension is constructed by different positions towards trust in established political institutions and attitudes towards Swedish membership in the EU and EU policy, while the third dimension is constructed by political interest vs. lack of interest (Bergström & Dalberg 2013).

⁹ Public demonstrations have successively been associated with new political interest groups: feminism, the environmental movement, LGBT movement, etc. In the early 1980s, the business sector took to the streets to demonstrate their disappointment with wage-earner funds (The 4th of October 1983), etc. At the turn of the century, there was a wave of transnational social protest and global activism in which associated groups previously considered as being in contradiction to each other acted in concert against privatizations, unemployment, for environment protection etc., (Seattle 1999, followed by the European cities of Brussels, Genoa, Florence, Rome, Gothenburg etc.), see Wennerhag (2006).

It is noteworthy that these “new forms” of political activity are scattered among the differing political orientations in the space of position-takings. Boycotts and boycotts are especially closely related to left-wing political position-takings and are overrepresented among students in social science programs oriented towards language and culture, while political activism – such as protest – appears to be more closely related to students in arts and media programs. It is in the upper level of the graph, along vertical axis 2 – structured by trust versus distrust in established political institutions – that we find an overrepresentation of non-responses to political “action groups” and “protest activity”. It is also in this area we find an overrepresentation of those who joined a political youth organization, 8.6 percent of the students in economic oriented social science programs are organized in a political youth party, 7 percent of the science students and 6.8 percent of the students in language and culture oriented social science programs are organized in a political party. In comparison with students in vocational programs these figures dose not reach above 2 percent (cf Table 1, Table 5 appendix). Thus, it is in the area of Figure 1 marked by trust in established political institutions that we find an emerging cautious approach toward protest and preferred adherence instead to the traditional, established political system. Accordingly, students are more likely to respond “contacted elected official” and “several times”, joined a political party and participated in party work (social science students in programs oriented towards economics).¹¹

A newspaper offers information that is not solely political; its purpose is a rather diverse offering of, to varying extents, international and national politics, news, arts and culture, and sports. In an attempt to examine the relationship between educational position and social origin and political orientation, it is enticing to analyze students’ choice of newspaper and the distribution of the choice of news pages.¹² In a similar vein to students’ civic engagement, memberships in

associations, and participation in various political activities, newspaper readers tend to scatter in the upper level of the graph. Readers of the newspapers’ opinion, editorial, foreign news, and arts pages are overrepresented on the left-hand side of the chart whereas sports pages and financial pages are overrepresented on right-hand side in Figure 1 (cf table 3). Close to 20% of students in science programs (19.8%) and students in language and culture-oriented social science programs (18.6%) responded that they regularly read at least one national daily paper. However, the local paper is the most common choice of newspaper even among those groups of students where it is least common to read a newspaper. Nearly 50% of students in language and culture-oriented social science programs responded they regularly read the local paper (cf Table 2). The evening papers are a more common choice among students in arts and media programs (20%) and a relatively common choice among students male-dominated and female-dominated vocational programs (approx. 10%). Relatively few, less than 5%, of students in science programs reported that they regularly read the evening paper. The free newspapers seem to be an alternative shunned by science students (cf Table 2).

¹¹ Students in science programs are less likely to participate in protest activities and are also overrepresented among position holders in favor of Swedish membership in NATO and the EU, also representing a trustful posture towards established political institutions (Bergström & Dalberg 2013).

¹² In comparison, available statistics report a decreasing trend in newspaper readership: In the 15-29 age group, total readership of daily newspapers has decreased to less than 50%. In the early 1990s, 64% read one of the dailies on an “average day,” a number that had increased to 70% in 1998. Since then, readership has steadily declined, reaching 51% in 2008 and 46% in 2009. As of 2008, approximately 22% read one of the evening papers every day (Svensk dagspress 2010, SCB, [Statistics Sweden]).

Table 2. Participation (“once” or “several times”) in political activities, percentage breakdown by educational program.

Program	N	Party work	Participate action group	Contact elected officials	Public demonstration	Protest political activism	Editorial letter	Boycott	Boycott	Political chat	Clothing as political consumerism	Culturejamming
Science	172	3.5	6.4	20.6	11.4	2.3	8.9	38.9	43.6	18.6	16.80	4.6
Technology	68	0	1.5	17.7	4.4	2.9	1.5	25.0	29.5	26.5	8.80	4.4
Social Science-language-cult	129	4.4	17.0	23.9	27.4	6.0	15.5	42.7	42.7	20.2	19.40	10.9
Social science-economics	210	10.0	10.5	20.9	17.6	5.1	9.5	26.2	26.2	20.2	12.90	8.5
Arts-media	210	3.4	5.2	14.2	16.6	9.7	11.5	30.4	30.4	16.2	14.30	10.9
Care-Health-service	134	2.3	5.2	5.4	7.5	3.7	2.1	15.6	15.6	8.2	8.20	6.7
Construction-vehicle-elct.	174	2.9	4.6	3.0	5.3	5.7	2.3	10.3	10.3	12.7	6.90	5.8
Total	1097	3.8	7.2	15.1	12.1	5.1	7.3	27.0	28.3	23.5	12.47	7.4

Table 3. Reading a newspaper, percentage breakdown by educational program.

Program	N	National Daily	Local paper	Evening paper	Free news paper	Read no paper	Total %
Science	172	19.80	36.00	4.70	0.60	39.00	100
Technology	68	10.30	44.10	8.80	1.50	35.30	100
Social Science-language-culture	129	18.60	48.10	5.40	1.60	26.40	100
Social science-economy	210	11.90	33.80	14.80	1.90	37.60	100
Arts-media	210	6.70	26.70	20.00	6.20	40.50	100
Health-care-service	134	3.00	23.10	11.90	6.00	56.00	100
Construction-vehicle-electricity	174	0.00	25.90	10.90	4.60	58.60	100
Total and mean %	1097	8.40	31.50	14.70	2.70	42.70	100

In the lower part of the graph we find an overrepresentation of members of “Local action groups” and “non-response” to “Contacts with elected officials” juxtaposed to distrust in established political institutions. In the lower right-hand corner there is an overrepresentation of members in motor clubs among students in male-dominated vocational programs

(construction, automotive, electricity). Far away in the opposite corner we find the very few members of feminist organizations. When comparing reported newspaper-reading habits, it is noteworthy that the editorial pages, foreign news, and arts pages tend to appeal in particular to science students and students in language and culture-oriented social science programs

to a relatively greater extent than students in any other program (cf Table 3).

The majority of students in automotive, construction, and electricity programs do not regularly read a newspaper (60% replied they did not read any paper), and none reported they regularly read any of the national dailies. Among newspaper readers in these vocational programs, the local pages seem to attract the majority of students. As such distinctions in newspaper readership correspond with the distinctions between an internationally oriented and conservative right-wing orientation in the space of political position-takings and these distinctions also correspond with social class structure. The probability of reading a national daily newspaper rises with educational resources (students in university-preparatory programs and culturally upper middle class social origin) whereas the probability of reading an evening paper varies in the opposite direction. Students in vocational programs with a working class origin are relatively more likely to read an evening paper than any of the national dailies. The distance between the positions characterized by trust in the political system, egalitarian attitudes towards immigrants, and interest in international political issues and opposing positions characterized by reluctance towards cultural pluralism and immigrant support, lack of interest in international political issues, and lack of trust in established political institutions seems to reflect the difference

between those who are more likely to read not only a local daily paper but also a national daily and furthermore, even more likely to read the sections of the paper that offer information about national and international political discourses and those least likely to read any of national dailies or any of the editorial, debate, or financial pages.

For example, among those students who reported they were very interested in issues of international peace and conflict, 26.7 percent responded they regularly read one of the dailies, whereas 5.9% only regularly read one of the evening papers. Exceedingly few (1.3%) of those who responded that they were not at all interested in international peace and conflict reported they regularly read any of the dailies. Local papers and local pages emerge as the wide-audience papers and pages, reducing the differences in readership between students in differing educational positions, and in different position-takings. For instance, the local pages attract slight more than 40% of those most interested in international peace and conflict, 33.5% of those who are least interested, and 23.9% of those who reported that they were not at all interested in these issues. Students in vocational programs tend to be more likely to read the ‘wide-audience’ pages; the comic strips, local, and sports pages: pages that are more or less acceptable or appealing to people of all tastes and value orientations.

Table 4. The distribution of readers of different news pages, percentage breakdown by educational program.

Program	N	Editorial pages	Opinion pages	Foreign pages	Domestic pages	Local pages	Arts pages	Financial affairs	Sports pages	Comic strips
Science	172	21.5	30.2	51.7	50.6	44.8	40.1	12.2	34.3	48.3
Technology	68	17.6	29.4	38.2	47.1	51.5	32.4	11.8	38.2	52.9
Social Science-language-culture	129	24.8	41.9	66.7	59.7	46.5	59.7	2.3	17.8	53.5
Social science-economy	210	16.7	23.8	46.7	51.4	51.0	27.1	17.1	40.5	37.6
Arts-media	210	16.7	20.5	35.2	41.0	41.4	45.7	4.8	22.4	48.6
Care- health-service	134	10.4	12.7	25.4	37.3	50.0	27.6	6.0	26.1	7.2
Construction-vehicle-electricity	174	9.2	9.8	16.7	30.5	40.8	12.1	8.0	37.4	43.1
Total N/mean %	1097	16.4	23.1	39.7	44.9	45.9	34.5	9.1	30.9	44.9

“If I only knew more...”

As shown, the probability of producing a response to the political questions on the questionnaire depends in

each of these cases on the *relationship* between the two dimensions of properties – the properties of the respondent and the question. The evident close rela-

tionship between educational position (social origin and inherited educational capital) and the propensity to answer, in particular, the most specifically political or political science-oriented questions – such as statements on foreign policy – might easily be interpreted as a “direct effect of unequal distribution of specific political competence defined ... by the possession of theoretical and practical knowledge needed to produce political actions and judgments and perhaps especially by command of political language, capacities which, one may assume, vary with educational capital” (Bourdieu 1984:408).

A: You certainly need to know more. If I knew more or was better informed, I might be more interested. I never follow the debates, really, on TV, or like [...] read the papers, never pay much attention to such ..., in politics or political issues, like you say. I mean, when you don't know all that much, you're kind of left behind [...] should I say [...] I am just not up to it. I certainly wouldn't go for it, and like [...] argue for one position or another. I simply wouldn't know how to *argue* for what I might feel is right. You know, you really have to *argue*, it seems like you actually need to convince other people that you are right or have something to say. [...] Some kids at school do take a stand [...], but none of my friends. I'd rather not bother with it (Female student, service program).

There is no doubt that an interested, attentive, and knowledgeable public has repeatedly been identified as a prerequisite for representative democracy.¹³ Nonetheless, the close relationship between educational position and propensity to respond politically, although self-evident judging by appearances, should not be over-interpreted (Bourdieu 1984: 399, 406-409). Bourdieu (1984: 399, 406-409) revealed how

the propensity to answer political questions, act, and judge politically is not sufficiently understood if reduced to *technical competence* defined as a matter of fact, knowledge, or being informed.¹⁴

A matter of status, social entitlement, or encouragement

Recalling the quoted responses to the question “Is there any political issue that you find interesting today?” in the introduction to this article, lack of interest in or indifference to politics stands in glaring contrast to being interested in and well-informed about politics and to political speech and judgment. However, the probability of speaking politically also seems intertwined with the *sense* of being entitled to be concerned with politics. This social status-linked condition appears in the distribution of “no opinion” responses and is made particularly clear in this study through the response rates to the statement: “Introduce national tests in all subjects in primary education,” which varies between 38% and 45% among sons and daughters of working class origin enrolled in a vocational program (automotive, construction, health care, and service programs) compared with about 10% among sons and daughters of highly educated parents enrolled in social science or science programs, most likely in preparation for university education. In this case, the propensity for a given social group to respond to such a statement is close to the group's objective chance of continuing on to higher education. The response rates depend on the extent to which the respondent depends (or relies) on the educational system for her or his own life course and therefore have an objective and subjective interest in its functioning (cf Bourdieu 1984: 411). In order to understand lack of interest in or indifference to politics, we need to see how this is related to the *propensity* to act politically.

The probability to produce an opinion is not only more likely among students with of culturally upper

¹³ The relationship between education and democratic citizenship has a long history in western philosophical and political philosophical tradition. We are drawing on Socrates' concept of the examined life, Aristotle's notion of reflective citizenship, and the Greek and Roman ideals of liberating education which Nussbaum (1997) reformulates in cultivating humanity. We are drawing on the German *bildung* and Continental Enlightenment philosophy (Kant), the Anglo-Liberal philosophy (Mill), American pragmatism (Dewey), contemporary political philosophy (Rawls 1996, pp 213, and Habermas 1997, p 488- 490). To Habermas 1997 (drawing on Julius Fröbel) political will formation is explicitly associated with compulsory secular education, in that he conceptualizes a political culture that is egalitarian, “divested of all educational privileges and thoroughly intellectual” (1997:490). This intellectualist *illusio* in Bourdieus (2000:65-72, 122pp) terms disclose a democratic doxa which supports all political thought and practice, making political choice or opinion a purely political judgment implementing explicitly political principles in order to produce a articulated response – an opinion.

¹⁴ A considerable amount of research effort has been devoted to analyzing the consequential effects of political information on voters (cf Bartles 1996, Berelson et al. 1954, Luskin 2003, Lau & Redlawsk 2001, Oscarsson 2007). Bartles (1996) conducted a counterfactual analysis of how a U.S. presidential election would have turned out if all voters were sufficiently informed. Holmberg & Oscarsson (2004) and Oscarsson (2007) replicated this study analyzing the Swedish elections from 1985 to 2002. The conclusions are that the direct effects of knowledge are very far-reaching. Regression analyses were performed with controls for variables such as gender, age, place of residence, and education. These variables are known to correlate with both elections and political knowledge and as such are correlations that are essential from our point of view and whose absence precludes examination of the objective social bases of representations of the division of political labor.

middle class origin in the university-preparatory science programs and language and culture-oriented social science programs (cf Bergström & Dalberg 2013). The interviews with the culturally upper middle class students disclosed a certain sense of entitlement to state a ‘personal opinion’.

“Opinionated habitus”

This kind of pretension to state a “personal opinion” is, particularly among students in the science programs, intertwined with a sort of distrust in delegation (cf Bourdieu 1984:414). The following quotation is from one of the interviews with students in the science programs and illustrates the point I want to make here. During the interview the respondent explained he was most interested in US politics. When asked to name a politician he admired or considered respectable, he named a couple and most importantly, emphasized that no *single* politician could simply represent his political opinions or views:

A: But in the Swedish political context [...] Maria Wetterstrand impresses me. She is a talented debater and has done much to create a Green Party policy that makes sense when it comes to political matters other than the environmental issues. As a result, she has become a more realistic alternative to the Social Democrats, the Liberal Party, etc. She is able to handle substantive debates about taxes, welfare, and education too. Per Schlingman is the man behind Reinfeldt's policy; many believe Reinfeldt is a good politician but Schlingman is the one who created the political rhetoric. Rhetoric is the whole idea; politics is all about conquest, conquering the right words. [...] As for me, I am not inclined to vote for or get involved in a party, and it is still hard to find one politician who stands for everything I value. Most importantly, as Voltaire wrote, “Think for yourself and let others enjoy the privilege of doing so too”. (Male student, Science program).

In order to understand the sense of entitlement to “personal opinion” it is not sufficient to consider the enhancement through educational position without the social conditions that produce “self-worth” and entitlement to personal opinion.

This staking of a “claim” to personal opinion and disinclination to delegate one’s will formation under the label of a common party or in line with a party platform was shown to be especially apt among students who seem particularly vigilant about choosing an educational path that will give them a variety of

options when investing in future higher education, among students whose futures are oriented towards individual deliverance, centered on personal merits, talents, and abilities (cf Bourdieu 1984:414-416).¹⁵

This staking of a claim to personal opinion was closely associated with an emphasis on the importance of staying informed and among those to whom newspapers were the kind of “viewspapers” that confirmed a sense of entitlement to some kind of citizenship, an entitlement and duty to express an opinion – whatever this opinion is – shaped by an everlasting effort to keep informed.

A: Most importantly, you have to keep informed. We live in a global area, society is globalized. The most important thing is to learn to critically examine the flow of information. We need to be able to scrutinize politicians, lobbyists, companies, etc. All you have left to rely on is your capacity to criticize. I, for instance, read the papers every day, I mean the dailies of course, and they give you some view of the world at least. It provides a view on the state of national and international issues. (Male student, Science program)

Conclusions

If we regard the questionnaire on politics as one chance to grasp the conditions of access to the political and political opinions and consider not first and foremost the space of political position takings but the opportunity producing or not producing any answer an their relation to various conditions we find that the capacity to adopt the needed posture to respond to the political questions depends on a variety of properties, on sex, educational position (and capital) and social origin (whereas the weight of inherited cultural capital is relative to economic capital).

The analysis of the “non-responses and “don’t know”-responses to political statements and questions, the distribution of political activities, memberships, and newspaper readership considerably enrich the interpretation of the space of political position-takings. The correspondence with the structure of position-takings reinforces the indicated hierarchical order of political socialization where different opinions, entwined with interest and trust in political institutions, outline what tends to be a homology between social structures and political orientations.

¹⁵ Cf Lidegran, I. (2009:226-230), Palme, M. (2008). Both studies disclose the strategies among elite students and their careful educational choices, made in order to avoid pathways that would limit their opportunity to make future choices.

The propensity to participate in politics, interest and/or participation in political will formation or simply to respond to political questions on a questionnaire is actually highly dependent upon educational position and educational resources and generally on the composition of cultural and economic properties, whereas it tends to increase with cultural properties as opposed to economic properties. Social groups with a relatively high amount of cultural and economic capital respectively are overrepresented in opposing positions on redistribution issues in the political space of position-takings in Uppsala. Students in the language and culture-oriented social science programs, with a culturally upper middle class origin are not only overrepresented among those who were most concerned with positioning themselves and responding to most political questions in the questionnaire, they also represent the multimembers who are more likely to participate in political actions, especially with a cultural and international orientation. It is striking how dispositions towards refugees and immigrant groups – separating students from preparatory educational programs with a cultural middle class social origin from students in vocational educational programs with a working class social origin dispossessed of cultural and/or economic assets – correspond with the propensity to invest in internationally oriented activities relative to local oriented. The propensity to participate in human rights and human aid organizations, spend time reading foreign, as well as editorial and opinion, pages raises when we move from vocational programs to preparatory programs, whereas students in vocational programs with a working class social origin are more likely oriented towards that which is local. Local papers, local and domestic pages and (although disappearing few) local action groups.

Ylva Bergström

Docent (Associate Professor), Sociology of education.
ylva.bergstrom@edu.uu.se

Abstract

This article centers on difference and similarities in political participation among young people. The analysis focuses first on the educational and social dimensions of all “don’t know” and “no opinion” responses to political questions in a survey on political opinions, interests, and attitudes, and secondly on civic en-

gagement and a wide range of political participation such as joining political parties or special interest groups, participating in political acts, and the propensity to read a newspaper, whether a national daily paper, a local paper, or an evening paper, and to what extent the opinion or arts pages attract different groups of students in upper secondary school. The analysis, inspired by a Bourdieusian approach to class and politics, reveal that social class still play an important role in understanding the distribution of political participation among young citizens.

Keywords

Young citizens, Politics, Political practice, Class, Geometric Data Analysis

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Appendix

Table 5. Distribution of memberships in associations, percentage breakdown by educational program.

Program	Science	Technology	Social Science- language- cult	Social science- economics	Media- art	Care- helath- service	Construction- vehicle-elctr.	Total
Sports club	50.6	44.1	31.0	46.7	28.1	27.6	36.8	37.8
Motor club	3.5	5.9	1.6	1.0	2.9	5.5	25.9	6.6
Animal rights assn.	1.2	1.5	3.1	2.9	2.9	2.2	1.7	2.2
Humanitarian aid org.	8.1	2.9	6.2	3.8	3.3	0.7	1.1	3.7
Immigrants assn.	0	0	0	1.4	1.0	3.0	1.7	1.0
Cultural assn.	11.9	5.9	19.6	3.3	7.7	1.5	3.3	7.6
Political youth org.	7.0	0	6.2	8.6	4.3	1.5	1.7	4.2
Feminist org.	0	0	1.0	0.5	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.5
Religious org.	4.7	5.9	8.5	1.9	6.7	6.0	2.9	5.2
Local action group	1.2	0	1.6	1.4	1.4	2.2	1.1	1.3
Environment org.	2.3	1.5	0.8	2.9	1.4	0	1.1	1.4
Human rights org.	7.0	5.9	5.4	1.4	2.4	0	0	3.2
Total N	172	68	129	210	210	134	174	1097

Conservative Distinctions: Moral and Cultural Conservatism

Jan-Magnus Enelo

Introduction

There is general consensus that both the demand and the supply of political opinions may be understood as two-dimensional.¹ The first dimension usually brought to the fore is a socio-economic attitude dimension that revolves around issues of economic equality. The second is a socio-cultural attitude dimension that instead poses questions about individual freedom and the extent to which individuals should be allowed to determine how they live their lives.

While earlier research has often been relatively concordant as to how the socio-economic dimension can be understood, there has been less clarity regarding the socio-cultural attitude dimension. According to De Koster and Van der Waal (2007), several different attitudes or value orientations are clustered here, based on the argument that they tend to empirically coincide. It emerges in a study by Enelo (2013) that there is reason to differentiate between on the one hand attitudes that concern the preservation of traditional morals, and on the other hand attitudes concerning xenophobia and the preservation of nation-specific culture. Attitudes associated with these two clusters of opinions are understood as constituting indicators of a single uniform position along the socio-cultural attitude dimension. Studies in which this attitude dimension is examined using only indicators of moral issues tend for example to also draw conclusions concerning xenophobia or cultural issues nevertheless and vice versa.² In contrast, in this pa-

per I will argue that there is reason to distinguish between the two and discuss how such a distinction can be conceptually understood and how it relates to social class and political party preference.

In the first section of the paper I describe the demand side of the political space based on research of Swedish conditions and discuss how attitude dimensions can be grasped as structured around opposite worldviews. The section also includes a discussion of how prior research has conceptualized the socio-cultural attitude dimension and concludes that the corresponding worldviews have been overburdened. In the following section I argue that the socio-cultural attitude dimension harbors two rather than one pair of opposite worldviews. These two pairs tend to coincide among socio-cultural liberals while the same is not true among socio-cultural conservatives. In the last section I discuss how the two socio-cultural conservative worldviews identified manifest and their causes.

A Socio-Cultural Attitude Dimension

Before the two aspects uncovered within this dimension are described, there is reason to describe the two-dimensional political space encompassing the socio-cultural attitude dimension. Adopting an attitude may be understood as a specific case of supply meeting demand (Bourdieu 1984:399) where political parties, among else, constitute the supply side. This supply should not be understood as consisting only of individual attitudes, but rather as different ways of understanding the social world, instruments of knowledge or principles of vision and division (Bourdieu 1984, 1991; Enelo 2013).

Understood as a two-dimensional space, capital volume and capital composition both influence the

¹See for example Harrits et al. (2009), Lipset (1959), Inglehart (1997), Houtman (2003), Kitschelt (1997), Kriesi et al. (2012; 2008a), and Svallfors (2004).

² This is done for example by Kohn (1977), Inglehart (1997; Inglehart & Welzel 2005), Houtman (2003; Houtman et al. 2008), and Svallfors (2004, 2005).

political attitudes held (Enelo 2013).³ Leftist socio-economic attitudes increase when total volume of capital is lower, while rightist socio-economic attitudes correspond with higher total volume. The tendency to hold leftist socio-economic attitudes also increases with the relative amount of cultural capital. It is this type of attitudes that mainly determine the choice to vote for parties in the left bloc or the right bloc. In respect of socio-cultural attitudes, liberal attitudes coincide with the amount of cultural capital and the weight of cultural capital possessed. Conversely, socio-culturally conservative attitudes correspond to low possession of cultural capital and capital composition in which cultural capital is relatively lightweight. These principles thus exhibit a homology with the first two dimensions of the social space at large (cf. Table 1).

Several scholars emphasize breadth of perspective as underlying a position along the socio-cultural attitude dimension, but such a proposition is inadequate to understand the difference between liberalism and conservatism (cf. Gabennesch 1972). Political attitudes, like other markers of lifestyle, can be understood as markers of taste (Bourdieu 1984), in this case, political taste, and indicate underlying principles of vision and division. In other words, what the socio-cultural attitude dimension brings together are opposing ways of understanding the world. These may be understood as constructed of various clusters of principles of vision and division.

Based on Gabennesch (1972), ways of apprehending the social world may be conceptualized as *worldviews*.⁴ A socio-cultural conservative worldview, or authoritarianism in Gabennesch's terms, can be understood as a consequence of apprehending the

social world as fixed rather than in process. Moral authority is taken as given and an absolute rather than as a consequence of social actions. And if parts of the social world appear beyond human influence, it tends to promote a sense of powerlessness and of being at the mercy of forces beyond one's control (cf. Kohn 1977). Such an outlook on the world can also lead to extrapunitiveness, adherence to the letter of the law, and advocacy of harsher punishments (Gabennesch 1972).

A socio-cultural conservative worldview can thus be understood as a consequence of a reified view of the social world (Berger & Luckmann 1967; Gabennesch 1972). This implies a forgetting of the history (Bourdieu 1977:78) of the moral and the cultural order. A narrow breadth of perspective can thus be understood as a part and a consequence of a socio-cultural conservative worldview, rather than the cause of such a worldview.

Lipset (1959) was one of the first to stress the existence of a socio-cultural attitude dimension, arguing that it was necessary to differentiate between economic liberalism and non-economic liberalism. Lipset describes non-economic liberalism as a tendency "to support, for example, civil liberties for political dissidents, civil rights for ethnic and racial minorities, internationalist foreign policies, and liberal immigration legislation" (Lipset 1959:485). In contrast, non-economic conservatism is characterized by the reverse. Lipset identifies this type of conservatism as flowing from the social situation of the lower classes. According to Lipset, a number of elements are typical of the working class, including low education, low participation in political organizations or in voluntary organizations of any type, isolated occupations and authoritarian family values and family patterns. Kohn (1977:189) similarly describes a dimension that goes from self-direction to conformity. The former consists of acting on one's own judgments and having a breadth of perspective, while the latter instead implies following the dictate of authority and intolerance to nonconformity. In a similar vein, Inglehart (1997) emphasizes individual liberty and self-expression, as a part of what he refers to as a postmaterialist value orientation, in contrast to a more survival-oriented materialism.

Houtman sums up the socio-cultural attitude dimension in a way that clearly shows the abundance of issues it contains:

People who find freedom of expression less important than maintaining the social order are also apt ... to have a problem with homosexuality, sexual liberty, and the decline of traditional gender roles


³ In a study of the Swedish space of political opinions (or field of consumption of political opinions), the space is examined by a multiple correspondence analysis (cf. Le Roux & Rouanet 2004) based on 16 variables: attitude toward: the reduction of the public sector; the reduction of social benefits; cutting taxes; selling state-owned business and public utilities; increasing the proportion of health care run by private interests; greater effort to promote independent schools; the introduction of child-rearing grants; the acceptance of fewer refugees; the introduction of a language test as a criterion for citizenship; working toward an environmentally friendly society; working toward a society in which Christian values are important; working toward a society that protects traditional Swedish values; working toward a society in which power is delegated from men to women; restriction of reproductive rights; allowing gay and lesbian couples to adopt children; and increasing the severity of prison sentences. The study uses the 2006 edition of The Swedish Election Studies. The data has been made available by Swedish National Data Services (SND) and was collected by Sören Holmberg, Henrik Oscarsson (Gothenburg University) and Statistics Sweden. Neither SND nor the principal investigators are responsible for the analyses presented in this paper (Enelo 2013).

⁴ Inglehart (1997:8) describes postmodernization as a new worldview.

and tend to be in favour of strict sentences for criminal offences and against immigration from non-Western countries (Houtman 2003:11-2).

The multiplicity of issues encompassed within the socio-cultural attitude dimension is however rarely matched to the empirical indicators used when it is studied. Houtman includes attitudes towards immigration in the concept and also draws conclusions about attitudes towards xenophobia, even though the indicators used do not include such issues. Likewise, Inglehart (1990, 1997; Inglehart & Welzel 2005) and Kohn (1977) state that socio-cultural conservatives tend to have xenophobic elements, and do so unsupported by empirical evidence (Enelo 2013:89-93).

Figure 1.



Conservative in the light of What? The Case for a Split

In claiming that the socio-cultural attitude dimension cannot be understood as uniform, my point is that it harbors not only two opposing worldviews (liberal and conservative) but (at least) two couplets of worldviews. One sets conservative moral values against more liberal values, while the other instead sets conservative cultural values against more liberal ones. At the liberal end of the socio-cultural attitude dimension, these two tend to coincide, while they are separated at the conservative extreme.⁵

⁵ This distinction between moral and cultural conservatism have been obtained by factorial analysis as well as by multiple correspondence analysis. Through Euclidean classification, seven tangible constellations of opinions through which individuals combine opinions from the socio-cultural and the socio-economic attitude dimensions have been identified: socio-cultural liberal left, socio-cultural liberal right, socio-economic left, moral conservative left, moral conservative right, cultural conservative left and cultural conservative right (Enelo 2013). Six of these constellations are represented in Figure 2, Table 1 and Table 2.

The difference then lies in what people are striving to conserve. The dividing line is whether people are defending traditional moral values or the notion of a nation-specific culture. In the case of the former, moral conservatism, the threat is perceived as emanating from modern life per se and the primary object is to conserve this morality. Moral conservatives support Christian values and child-rearing benefit while advocating a more restrictive stance regarding abortion. In the case of the latter, the telling concept is cultural conservatism; cultural conservatives are not primarily advocating traditional morals, but rather the notion of nation-specific values. The threat to their own way of life is perceived as emanating from other cultures drawing too close. Cultural conservatives believe in acceptance of fewer refugees and language requirements for citizenship, defend Swedish values, and wish to institute harsher punishments for criminal offenses. Restricting reproductive rights and defending Christian values are not considered as important.


In terms of political opinions, the difference between the political right and left bloc may, as mentioned, be understood as constituted of socio-economic attitudes. First and foremost, socio-cultural attitudes influence which political party within the political blocs the individual supports. Combined with leftist socio-economic attitudes, conservative socio-cultural attitudes (of the moral as well as the cultural variety) tend to lead to higher support for the Social Democratic Party than for the Left Party or Green Party. In other words, the distinction between moral conservatism and cultural conservatism seems not to be especially significant to party selection within the left bloc. This distinction does, however, make a difference to party selection within the right bloc among socio-cultural conservatives. When conservative opinions are held along with rightist socio-economic attitudes, cultural conservatives are most likely to vote for the Moderate Party, while moral conservatives are more distinguished by voting for the Christian Democrats.

However, socio-cultural attitudes are significant not only to party selection within the ideological blocs – they also give rise to voting that contradicts personal socio-economic attitudes when individuals support a party whose socio-economic attitudes differ from their own. Socio-cultural attitudes engender movements between the two political blocs and beyond the blocs (cf. Table 1). The most distinct tendency for conservative attitudes is that they induce individuals with leftist socio-economic attitudes to vote for rightist parties. Among individuals who

combine leftist socio-economic attitudes with morally conservative attitudes, 7.6 percent report that they support the Christian Democrats (and they make up a significant portion of the party's supporters). Among those with culturally conservative attitudes, 10.1 percent support the Moderate Party. Conservative socio-cultural attitudes also give rise to support for

the Sweden Democrats, primarily in relation to the cultural conservative left (3.9 percent). At the other end of the socio-cultural attitude dimension, liberal attitudes instead engender movement towards the Green Party, despite rightist socio-economic attitudes (7.2 percent).

Figure 2. Socio-cultural worldviews, differentiated by socio-economic attitudes



As mentioned, socio-cultural conservatives tend to have a low amount of capital and a capital composition dominated by economic capital. Nevertheless, the difference between cultural conservatives and moral conservatives may be seen in terms of both total amount of capital and capital composition (cf. Table 2). Cultural conservatives generally possess less capital than moral conservatives: cultural conservatives are more likely than moral conservatives to belong to the working class and less likely to belong to the upper middle class. The capital possession of cultural conservatives is also more likely to

be dominated by economic capital, while the capital possessed by moral conservatives is instead dominated by cultural capital.

That cultural liberalism and moral liberalism coincide illustrates that there is still reason to regard the distinct worldviews revealed here as part of a larger socio-cultural attitude dimension. The importance of not blithely joining cultural conservatism and moral conservatism is however glaringly apparent at the conservative extreme of the attitude dimension. These are two worldviews whose holders tend to be of different ages, possess different amounts of

capital and capital compositions, and they tend to vote for different political parties (Enelo 2013).

Conservatisms as Worldviews

Thus far, we have established that the socio-cultural attitude dimension carries two different aspects with diverse empirical characteristics that give rise to two different worldviews at the conservative end of the attitude dimension. This section describes how these two are manifest and their causes.

Moral conservatism can be understood as conservatism grounded in the nostalgia for a traditional moral order of things (Svallfors 2005). Religious faith can partly be understood as the locus of this kind of conservatism, providing a frame of reference for understanding (Hunsberger & Jackson 2005) and implying that we are dealing with a religious worldview combined with a moral traditionalism. The corresponding worldview can thus be understood as stemming from Christian religiosity as a form of a traditional grand narrative (De Koster & Van der Waal 2007).

The morality championed, and the rejection of the diversification of lifestyles, is not restricted to religious faith. It can also be grounded in moral intolerance (cf. Napier & Jost 2008), whether accompanied by religious commitment or not. According to Bourdieu (1984:433), this type of conservatism may depend upon individuals' movements in the social space.⁶ In such cases, this refers to individuals who cannot preserve the capital value to which their position once corresponded. This engenders a sense that the established order acknowledges them less than they acknowledge it. The individuals' attitudes and values are characterized by a conservatism aimed against modern life and a perceived poorer standard of living in respect of both economic standard of living and their own position's prestige or social standing.⁷ This may be understood as a conservative strategy aimed at re-establishing a social order that acknowledged and rewarded them more. The fact that farmers, for example, are over-represented suggests that this might be the case.

The cultural aspect of the socio-cultural attitude dimension instead sets a more closed and nationalistic conservatism against a more open and cosmopolitan liberalism (cf. Lachat & Kriesi 2008:275). The low possession of cultural capital among cultur-

al conservatives combined with support of the Sweden Democrats and harsher punishment for crime indicates proximity to what previous research has designated authoritarianism.

As suggested regarding authoritarianism, cultural conservatism may be understood as a response to anomie (De Koster & Van der Waal 2007) and a sense of loss of meaning, a social agoraphobia (Houtman et al. 2008:123) in face of cultural diversification. A seemingly nostalgic identification with the national community, an attempt to protect the national culture (Kriesi et al. 2008b:8), is put in place to counter-balance this cultural insecurity and lack of perceived social order. Cultural conservatism can thus be understood as a way of attempting to reduce cultural insecurity.

Among those with the lowest possession of capital, and especially the lowest amount of cultural capital, cultural conservatives are largely made up of groups whom globalization has subjected to labor market competition with increased job insecurity as a result, in other words, the losers of globalization (cf. Kriesi et al. 2008b; Lachat & Dolezal 2008). In light of this, one explanation of cultural conservatism is that it involves an understanding of one's economic situation that departs from traditional socio-economic interpretations. The individual's personal precarious economic situation is understood as a consequence of a specific group; that is, as a consequence of immigration. Cultural conservatism can, in other words, be understood as a socio-cultural manifestation of defending a standard of living where the threat to the standard of living is thought to emanate from immigration. This may be expressed through emphasis of not only distributive justice, but "retributive justice, i.e., judgments about the justice of sanctioning those who deviate from group norms" (Houtman et al. 2008:102), a socio-cultural strategy aimed at a socio-economic situation.⁸

The low level of possession of cultural capital is also manifest in a low level of political skill (Enelo 2013:84-5). This becomes evident through a difference in the complexity of understanding that gives rise to political opinions. Culturally conservative attitudes may here be understood as based upon the immediacy of social conditions, upon their face value. Often, disadvantaged groups are seen as the problem instead of the underlying social structures

⁶ As Evans (1993) points out, the perception of what future opportunities may exist affect party selection.

⁷ This idea is consistent with the fact that moral conservatives generally possess less economic capital than cultural conservatives, even though they are older and possess more capital in total.

⁸ Something which may lead to the working class beginning to vote more often for rightist parties: "the more the welfare state is constructed in moral terms, the more working-class authoritarianism undermines support for the welfare state" (Houtman et al. 2008:105).

that might conceivably be the cause of prevailing social conditions (jfr Gabennesch 1972). The appeal lies not only in the contents of the explanation, but its simplicity (jfr Lipset 1959).

Both cultural and moral conservatism can thus be understood as carrying an element of nostalgia and a wish for a re-establishing of the social order. They differ in their understanding of the cause of the worsening of the social order, whether it is due to the worsening of morals or due to cultural diversification. They are, however, both susceptible to mobilization in the name of an ethnic and moral reformulation of a lost 'people's home.'

Jan-Magnus Enelo

Lecturer at School of Humanities, Education and Social Science, Örebro university

Abstract

There is general consensus that the demand and the supply of political opinions may be understood as two-dimensional, with one attitude dimension stressing issues of economic equality and one revolving around questions of individual freedom. In this article I highlight a vagueness regarding how the second, socio-cultural, attitude dimension has been studied in prior research. I argue that the attitude dimension harbors two different aspects, one regarding moral questions and one regarding questions about culture, and discuss how these two aspects can be conceptualized as consisting of different world views.

Keywords

Political space, worldview, cultural conservatism, moral conservatism, political opinions

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Appendix

Table 1. Socio-cultural worldviews and party preference.

Party	N	In set (%)	Liberal (%)		Cultural conservative (%)		Moral conservative (%)	
			Left	Right	Left	Right	Left	Right
Left Party	97	5.2	20.2	0.9	4.3	0.8	4.5	0.0
Social Democratic Party	561	30.2	38.6	8.1	52.3	8.9	48.0	11.6
Center Party	147	7.9	5.5	15.7	5.4	5.9	7.6	9.0
Liberal Party	136	7.3	4.0	12.8	3.1	8.9	5.6	10.1
Moderate Party	410	22.0	1.8	40.0	10.1	55.7	4.0	31.7
Christian Democratic Party	127	6.8	0.7	4.7	3.1	4.6	7.6	27.5
Green Party	107	5.8	16.9	7.2	3.1	0.4	4.0	1.1
Sweden Democrats Party	34	1.8	0.0	0.4	3.9	2.5	2.5	3.2
	1619	87.0	87.9	89.8	85.3	87.8	83.8	94.2

Table 2. Socio-cultural worldviews and class fractions.

Class	N	In set (%)	Liberal (%)		Cultural conservative (%)		Moral conservative (%)	
			Left	Right	Left	Right	Left	Right
Upper middle	247	14.0	23.5	27.9	4.8	11.4	7.5	18.6
Cultural	117	6.6	17.3	9.3	2.0	2.7	4.3	9.3
Balanced	79	4.5	3.8	12.8	1.2	3.6	2.7	3.8
Economic	51	2.9	2.3	5.8	1.6	5.0	0.5	5.5
Middle	765	43.3	46.9	51.3	31.6	47.7	32.6	49.2
Cultural	329	18.6	31.2	20.4	10.8	11.4	13.4	17.5
Balanced	105	5.9	5.4	9.7	5.6	5.0	3.7	4.4
Economic	331	18.8	10.4	21.2	15.2	31.4	15.5	27.3
Workers	753	42.7	29.6	20.8	63.6	40.9	59.9	32.2
	1861	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Political Competence in the United States

Daniel Laurison

Ideally, democracy should mean that people in all social positions can participate equally in political decision-making, through voting and other means. In reality, political participation in the United States is profoundly unequal: those with the most resources participate the most, and the less-privileged are the least likely to vote (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).¹ Understanding the roots of this political inequality is a central enterprise of political scientists and sociologists; however, much of the work on this issue focuses too much on the objective or structural barriers to participation for lower-income and less-educated people, and largely ignores the subjective and felt forces that also limit political participation.

In this article, I draw on Pierre Bourdieu's (1984) concept of political competence to focus on these harder-to-measure aspects of the relationship between social position and political participation. I use multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) to explore whether patterns of class-differentiated political competence are evident in the context of the United States; I show that they are.

Political Competence

American scholars of politics mostly stay away from Bourdieu (Swartz 2006), so there has been little research applying Bourdieu's work on politics, in *Distinction* or elsewhere, to the American context (one exception is Herbst 1992; Wacquant 2005 also includes some discussion of the United States, while Wacquant 2001 focuses more on government than on elections).

For Bourdieu, political participation is shaped by two types of political competence: technical compe-

tence, and perceived legitimacy or the *sense* of political competence. These types of competence are inter-related; people have

a greater or less capacity to recognize a political question as political and to treat it as such by responding politically, i.e., on the basis of specific political principles (rather than ethical ones, for example). This capacity is inseparable from a more or less strong feeling of being *competent*, in the full sense of the word, which is socially recognized as entitled to deal with political affairs, to express an opinion about them or even to modify their course. (1984: 399; emphasis in original)

Those with smaller volumes of capital are generally socially distant from key actors in the political field: the people producing political content, as well as those reporting on it and those generating survey questions about it, are generally well-educated and relatively well-compensated. This social distance, combined with lower status and fewer resources, limits these individuals' exposure to dominant modes of engaging with politics, and so also limits both their technical political competence and their sense of political competence. (This is not to say, of course, that this is the only factor that matters for participation, or that *only* the advantaged can have high levels of political competence.) The key conceptual move here is that, just as a "taste" for "fine art" and the attendant ability to form opinions about the relative merits of one classic painting over another rarely arises spontaneously among the less-advantaged (however often they might pass art museums on their way to work), a "taste" for politics is not generated simply by exposure to political news or campaign advertising.

There are three ways a low or absent sense of political competence might be observed through a survey: first, those without a sense of political competence will, in a survey or opinion poll, be likely to refuse to answer political questions. In France in the 1960s and 1970s, Bourdieu found that "The probabil-

¹ Portions of this article appear in the forthcoming chapter: Laurison, Daniel. 2013. "La production des opinions aux États-Unis, trente ans après *La Distinction*." In *Trente ans après La distinction de Pierre Bourdieu*, edited by Philippe Coulangeon and Julien Duval. Paris: Éditions la Découverte. The representation of social space constructed using MCA is similar, though not identical, to that presented in that chapter, and so there is some replication in the data and methods sections. Additionally, there is some overlap in the discussion of American work on political competence, and in the discussion of "don't know" responses.

ity of producing an opinion [...was] greater for men than for women, [...] rises with educational capital [...] and economic capital [...] and with social position" (1984:400). American studies of social differences in "don't know" rates (Francis and Busch 1975; Berinsky 2004; Converse 1976) found similar patterns, but explain these differences purely in terms of *technical competence*, i.e. education and knowledge. However, as Bourdieu points out,

to understand the relationship between educational capital and the propensity to answer political questions, it is not sufficient to consider the capacity to understand, reproduce, and even produce political discourse, which is guaranteed by educational qualifications; one also has to consider the (socially authorized and encouraged) sense of being entitled to be concerned with politics, authorized to talk politics, by applying a specific political culture, i.e., explicitly political principles of classification and analysis [...] (1984: 409).

Studies of political sophistication, information, and knowledge (e.g. Galston 2001; Mondak 1999; Levendusky 2011; Petersen, Slothuus, and Togeby 2010) engage with *technical* political competence, but not the *sense* of political competence. The insights of qualitative studies of political engagement suggest that it is not only people's explicitly-held knowledge or cognitive abilities that shape approaches to politics, but also their often non-conscious ideas about themselves and their place in society (Bourdieu 1984, 1979). A lack of political competence, then, should lead to not only a lower propensity to answer political questions, but also reporting attitudes about politics consistent with the idea that this is a realm for other people, and reporting lower rates of voting.

The connection Bourdieu is making with the concept of political competence has three pieces: class and social position shape *habitus*, including perceptions of and a "taste" for politics, or political competence; political competence in turn affects participation; and class and resources also directly facilitate or limit political participation. Work on political participation has dealt extensively with the direct link between social position and participation, and with the link between perceptions of or knowledge about politics and participation, but much less with the social position-perceptions link. This paper is one part of the project of filling in that (mostly) missing link between social positions and ways of understanding, relating to, and perceiving political content and political action.

Without Political Competence

The dominant explanation for the link between class position and political participation is that there are both cognitive skills and material resources necessary for participation in political life (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995); those with less income and education also lack these resources (either because income and education provide them, or because education and income are in turn linked to occupations where relevant skills can be gained). Other studies have included additional mechanisms, including mobilization, group memberships and social network ties, to explain individual differences in likelihood of voting (e.g. Leighley 1995; Teixeira 1992; Timpone 1998).

Political scientists have dealt with the question of individuals' relations to politics by studying the causes and effects of individual political knowledge or sophistication (Carpini and Keeter 1997; Luskin 1987; Popkin 1991) and sense of efficacy (Niemi, Craig, and Mattei 1991; Soss 1999; White 1968). Those with more knowledge, resources, and efficacy (both external and internal—the closest equivalent to the notion of "political competence") are consistently more likely to participate in politics—by voting, contacting elected officials, campaigning, and/or approving of protests—than those with less, even after controlling for educational level (Pollock 1983). Although many of these terms—political engagement, interest, knowledge, internal and external efficacy, and sophistication—are certainly related to the sense of political competence, with few exceptions (Jackman 1970), there is little quantitative work on the ways social position influences feelings of political efficacy or political interest; in studies of the predictors of efficacy, income is sometimes (but not always) used as a "control" but otherwise tends to be ignored (Dyck and Lascher 2008).

A number of qualitative studies, however, have described the class-perception link central to Bourdieu's account of political competence (see Halle 1987; Gaventa 1980; Fantasia 1989; also see Lukes 1974). They show that social position not only shapes political opinions, "objective knowledge" of politics, and voting rates, but also how people think about and understand politics and their place (or lack of place) in political discourse and decision-making.

Eliasoph (1998), despite deliberately avoiding talking about her subjects' class positions, provides good evidence for the role of a classed sense of political competence in shaping political participation. Members of the least civically engaged groups in her study had less income and education than those in the other groups (1998: Appendix 1). These less-involved

people believed that “the only people qualified to hold opinions are those who ‘have all the facts,’” and therefore that “politics is not our responsibility. Politics is something that other people do, but not us” (1998: 134). Similarly, in seeking to explain lower participation in “new social movements” among the working classes, Croteau (1995) provides an account of the ways that “working class” people relate to the political differently than those in the “middle class.” He shows that working class people “are unlikely to have the sense of entitlement, vision of achievable change, and specialized skills that result in a sense of efficacy and that facilitate movement participation” (1995: 147), and that this lack of a sense of entitlement stems from “structural conditions [and] differentially available cultural resources—based on class status—[that] help to facilitate or hinder the development of a sense of efficacy (1995: 137). It is this description of the status-based sense of entitlement to participate or even form opinions that is missing from most survey-based accounts of political engagement, and which this paper seeks to supplement using nationally-representative quantitative analyses.

Bourdieu’s theories of political competence were grounded in his analyses of French opinion surveys; here, I test whether the patterns in the US population look like those found in France in the 1960s. If patterns in the United States in the 21st century can be understood through a reading of *Distinction*, we would expect to see the level of political competence rise with greater quantities of capital and to see evidence of lower political competence among those with less capital. In what follows, I explain the two key operationalizations of political competence examined in this study, then use multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) with data from the General Social Survey to analyze the extent to which political competence indicators vary with social position. I will show that the less-privileged are more likely to say they “don’t know” to political questions than those with more resources, and that those with the most capital and evince much greater confidence in their ability to engage with politics and government than do those with the least. These low-political-competence indicators are located close to non-voting in the representation of social space constructed through MCA.

Indicators of Political Competence

The “sense of being entitled” to politics indicated by the concept of political competence is a *relational* sense—it is not likely to be secured through passing above a particular income threshold or gaining a cer-

tain educational qualification, so much as it has to do with an individual’s sense of his or her place in the social world, and thus that he or she is the *type* of person who does politics. The important question to ask regarding the distribution of political competence, then, is not whether particular educational credentials or income thresholds predict higher levels of political competence; instead, the key question is the extent to which indicators of political competence vary with social position.

Indicator 1: Opinion-offering/“don’t know” responses

A person’s willingness or refusal to offer an opinion on a political question is an indicator of their political competence. Faced with a survey question that asks respondents to choose among a pre-given set of answers, someone lacking only the particular technical or factual knowledge to respond to that question—such as what the terms “liberal” and “conservative” mean with regard to political ideology—could simply choose a neutral answer near the middle of the given scale, choose at random, or make a guess at a reasonable response (Krosnick, Narayan, and Smith 1996). But, when an agent is called upon to make use of his or her political competence (or put in a situation, such as answering a political poll or a filling out a ballot, where the lack of this competence is made clear), technical competence is not the only factor. The *social* component of political competence, “a more or less strong feeling of being *competent*, in the full sense of the word, that is socially recognized as entitled to deal with political affairs, to express an opinion about them or even to modify their course. (1984: 399),” must also come into play. While a simple lack of knowledge might lead respondents to guess, given most respondents’ reluctance to say “don’t know” when it is not explicitly offered (Bishop, Tuchfarber, and Oldendick 1986), those who also feel less entitled to participate in politics might be more likely to simply say they “don’t know” the answer.

If political competence varies with class, then, those with the least capital should respond with the most “don’t knows” to political questions, especially those most difficult to answer on the basis of hermeneutics used to solve other sorts of problems.

Political Competence Indicator 2:

Efficacy Questions

The concept of political competence has some overlap with measures of internal political efficacy, which ask questions such as whether the respondent has a “good understanding” of political issues, whether “most people” understand politics better than the respondent.

Low political competence should also be reflected in measures of “external” political efficacy, such as questions about whether legislators care about “people like” the respondent, and whether regular people can influence government; all of these items assess the extent to which survey respondents believe that government and politics are matters that they are entitled to be concerned with. Thus, if political competence varies with social location, we should expect those with the most resources to express the most confidence that they understand politics, and the highest levels of belief that government cares about them and that they can influence the government; those with the least resources should report feeling² the least politically “efficacious.”

Data and Methods

Geometric Data Analysis, specifically Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) facilitates this kind of relational analysis. MCA is an extension of the correspondence analyses featured in *Distinction* (Le Roux and Rouanet 2009; Rouanet, Ackermann, and Le Roux 2000; Lebaron 2010). Bourdieu deployed Geometric Data Analysis methods in *Distinction* and much of his work thereafter because “the particular relations between a dependent variable (political opinion) and so-called independent variables such as sex, age and religion, tend to dissimulate the complete system of relations that make up the true principle of the force and form specific to the effects recorded in such and such particular correlation” (p. 103). This method makes it easy to show both indicators of the political competence are distributed in social space, across class and educational differences as well as other differences highly salient for generating opinions on public issues in the United States.

The data used in these analyses come from the General Social Survey (GSS), a long-running, nationally representative study which asks questions on a range of topics from religion and ethics to party identification and vote choice. The GSS uses a stratified probability sample, and had an N for 2000–2006 (the years of data used in this analysis) of 12,904; individuals with missing data on one or more of the active variables in the MCA were not used to structure the analysis; that left 4,832 active individuals.

To understand the figures presented in an MCA, one only needs to know that the method analyzes an-

swers to a set of categorical questions chosen by the researcher; it uses these answers to construct a cloud of individuals based on their responses so that the distance between any two individual points in the space indicates the dissimilarity of those individuals' responses to the questions used in constructing the space. Individuals with identical answers to all questions would be located at the same point; individuals with no overlap whatsoever will be quite distant from one another, and more distant the less their responses are shared by others. An analogous cloud of categories (response modalities) is also constructed; the location of a given category is the essentially the average position in the space of all the individuals choosing that category (plus a transformation to move from the cloud of individuals to the cloud of categories). These clouds are projected onto axes so as to maximize the portion of the variance captured by each successive axis. It is then possible to locate categories from questions *not* used in constructing the space in the cloud of categories; the coordinates of one of these “supplemental” categories along an interpreted axis indicate the degree and direction of correlation between membership in that category and in the categories which contribute to that axis.

Results 1: The Active Categories—Constructing a Representation of (modified) Social Space

For Bourdieu and most of his followers, constructing a social space usually meant starting with a space of tastes for some set of cultural products, and then using supplementary categories to understand how volume and composition of capital structure that space (Le Roux et al. 2008; Harrits et al. 2010). However, while volume of capital is the primary dimension of difference across every national context studied using MCA thus far, not all societies are structured also by composition of capital; for example, in the United Kingdom it is primarily age that differentiates tastes on a second axis (Prieur and Mike Savage 2011). Here, I begin by constructing a theoretically-informed representation of a broadly-construed social space, using not only indicators of capitals but also of other socially and politically relevant distinctions. I then project political questions into that space as supplementary variables.


In order to represent the social space of the United States, I used variables indicating cultural and economic capital, religious orientation, age, and residential characteristics, as these capture the main axes of difference in American politics. As is customary in MCA, I tried a number of combinations of active variables and recodings in order to achieve a stable rep-

² If lower-income people feel this way, this is most likely an accurate assessment, both of their understanding of politics – their level of “technical competence,” and of the extent to which government is responsive to the needs of poor and working class people (Gilens 2005).

resentation of the data (one not overly affected by small changes in recodings), a well-balanced one (such that very small categories are not exerting undue influence on the principal axes), and one with a relatively high level of total variance captured by the first few axes. I settled on nine questions with 40 active categories. Three questions related to capital and capital composition: occupation (based on the Erikson-Goldthorpe 7-category scheme, 1992:140), household income (in quintiles), and educational de-

gree (all indicated by triangles in Figure 1). Four related to demographic and residential characteristics: age (in five categories), type of home, region of the country, and size of the metropolitan area (indicated by squares). Finally, two questions concerned religion: religious fundamentalism and church attendance (indicated by circles). These nine questions each have between 3 and 6 active categories. The resulting cloud of individuals is well-distributed, indicating no problems with the analysis.

Figure 1. All Active Categories in Plane 2-1



Interpreting the Axes

The first step in analyzing the results of an MCA is to interpret the axes³ (Greenacre 2006:141). Table 1 presents the eigenvalues and modified rates of variance of the first five axes. Axes are interpreted using the “contributions and points” method (Le Roux and Rouanet 2009); a category is included in the interpretation of an axis if it has a contribution to the total variance of that axis greater than it would be if all points made equal contributions, i.e., greater than the average contribution (by definition, simply $1/k$, where k is the number of categories). Table 2 lists the contributions and coordinates of all the categories active in structuring the space; categories that contribute above the threshold for interpretation for an axis are in bold font. Figure 1 displays the category points for all the active categories.

Axis 1, as in most constructions of social spaces using GDA methods (Prieur, Rosenlund, and Skjott-Larsen 2008; Le Roux et al. 2008; Blasius and Friedrichs 2008), is clearly a volume-of-capital axis, with the largest contributions made by degree and income. The axis is also defined by contributions from the “trailer” category (a type of low-cost, pre-fabricated home), the fundamentalist category (a religious orientation found disproportionately among the less-advantaged), and the opposition between (often wealthier) large metropolitan areas and (often poorer) rural areas.

Axis 2 is defined primarily by religiosity (church attendance and fundamentalism) and secondarily by residential characteristics. On the left of Figure 1 are categories associated with less religiosity, with cities, and with the coasts; categories indicating greater religiosity and life in smaller towns and rural areas are on the right. This is what American political commentators might call a “red-state, blue-state” axis; I call it a cosmopolitanism axis, with greater connections to urban centers and religious practices that look more like those in Europe on the left, and the opposite characteristics on the right. This axis also captures differences in capital composition rather well: those with more education but lower incomes are centered on the left (urban/less-religious) side (not shown here), while those with higher incomes and less education are centered on the right; these oppositions, however, do not appear to contribute much to differences in political competence in the United States; instead, most of the

meaningful distinctions correspond to volume of capital as captured by the first axis.

³ First one must decide how many axes to interpret; here, the first two axes were retained for analysis. The modified rate for the first axis is 64% of the variance; adding the 2nd axis brings the cumulative total to 82%, while adding the third axis contributes little mathematically or substantively to the interpretation.

Table 1. Eigenvalues and Modified Rates

	Axis 1	Axis 2	Axis 3	Axis 4	Axis 5
Variances of Axes (eigenvalues)	0.238	0.179	0.150	0.147	0.141
Percentage of Total Variance	6.82%	5.13%	4.30%	4.21%	4.04%
Modified Rates	63.8%	18.2%	5.97%	5.11%	3.53%
Cumulated Modified Rates	63.8%	82.0%	88.0%	93.1%	96.6%

Table 2. Contributions & Coordinates

	Axis 1		Axis 2	
	<i>Coord- inate</i>	<i>Contri- bution</i>	<i>Coord- inate</i>	<i>Contri- bution</i>
Degree				
less than hs	-1.1	8.2	0.24	0.5
high school	-0.31	2.3	-0.01	0
junior college	0.35	0.4	-0.29	0.4
college degree	0.98	7.4	-0.04	0
graduate	1.48	9	-0.04	0
<i>Cumulative Contribution of the Question</i>		18.3		0.9
Occupational Group				
professional	1	1.5	0.7	5.5
manager	0.61	0.3	0.06	0
other white collar	-0.16	0.8	-0.25	0.8
skilled worker	-0.53	0.6	-0.33	1.5
less-skilled worker	-0.83	1.5	-0.07	0.1
<i>Cumulative Contribution of the Question</i>		4.8		8
Type of Home				
trailer	-1.32	5.4	-0.21	0.2
house	0.2	1.2	-0.34	4.8
apartment	-0.23	0.5	1.14	14.6
<i>Cumulative Contribution of the Question</i>		7		19.6
Income Quintile				
bottom 20% inc	-1.02	8.2	0.51	2.8
2nd 20% inc	-0.53	2.4	0.19	0.4
middle 20% inc	0.01	0	-0.07	0
4th 20% inc	0.46	2.1	-0.37	1.8
top 20% inc	1.16	10	-0.19	0.3
<i>Cumulative Contribution of the Question</i>		22.8		5.4
Fundamentalism				
fundamentalist	-0.52	3.7	-0.73	9.6
relig. moderate	0.15	0.4	0.05	0.1
relig. liberal	0.31	1.3	0.63	7.1
<i>Cumulative Contribution of the Question</i>		5.4		16.8
Church Attendance				
church weekly or more	0.04	0	-0.78	9.7
church monthly	-0.08	0.1	-0.23	0.7
church occasionally	0.09	0.1	0.2	0.8
church never	-0.11	0.1	0.89	9.8
<i>Cumulative Contribution of the Question</i>		0.3		21



Continued table 2

	Axis 1		Axis 2	
	Coord- inate	Contri- bution	Coord- inate	Contri- bution
Region				
east coast	0.35	1	0.63	4.3
rust belt	-0.06	0	-0.05	0
plains and mountain	-0.13	0.1	-0.18	0.3
inland south	-0.43	1.5	-0.54	3
south east coast	-0.13	0.2	-0.4	2
pacific	0.47	1.4	0.67	3.9
<i>Cumulative Contribution of the Question</i>		4.2		13.5
Metropolitan Area Size				
big metro	0.39	1.5	0.64	5.3
medium metro	0.25	0.7	0.28	1.2
smaller metro	-0.14	0.4	-0.24	1.5
no metro	-0.74	3.1	-0.9	6
<i>Cumulative Contribution of the Question</i>		5.7		14
Age Group				
18-29	-0.43	1.5	0.7	5.5
30s	0.17	0.3	0.06	0
40s	0.28	0.8	-0.25	0.8
50-64	0.25	0.6	-0.33	1.5
65 and over	-0.44	1.5	-0.07	0.1
<i>Cumulative Contribution of the Question</i>		4.8		8

Results 2: Political Competence

After a modified social space has been constructed, multiple correspondence analysis can display the ways that space structures political competence by projecting answers to questions *not* used to create the space onto the primary axes. A “supplemental” category is thus positioned in the space on essentially the average of the positions of all the individuals supplying that answer; the greater the distance between categories, the greater the social distance in the constructed space between the groups of individuals who chose each of those responses.

Figure 2a, 2b, 2c:
Political and Worldview “Don’t knows”



Figures 2a, 2b, and 2c show the cloud of individuals: each dot represents one individual survey respondent. In Figures 2a and 2b, the size of each dot indicates the frequency with which the respondent answered “don’t know” to up to five political questions⁴ (not all respondents are given all items in the GSS; the questions are on the role of government, political ideology, and confidence in the legislature, the federal government, and the judiciary); larger dots indicate that the respondent said “don’t know” to a greater portion of the political questions they received. In Figure 2a, the colors of the dots indicate whether an individual said they “don’t know” their position on the political ideology scale (from extremely conservative to extremely liberal; black is “don’t know” and grey is any substantive non-missing answer); in Figure 2b, the colors correspond to whether and for whom respondents reported voting in the 2004 election. In Figure 2c, responses to non-political questions are shown: the size of the dots indicates the frequency with which respondents answered “don’t know” to questions about their view of the world (such as their image of characteristics of God, and whether people are generally trustworthy, helpful, and fair); dots are black if the individual said they “don’t know” whether there is an afterlife, and grey if they gave an answer.

Figure 2a shows clearly that rates of political “don’t know” response increase as volume of capital decreases along Axis 1: the larger dots (for more “don’t knows”) and the black dots (for not knowing ideology) are concentrated in the lower half of the constructed social space. Compare this with Figure

⁴ I included only those questions about politics that were A) framed as questions about what government should or should not do (not those asked in moral terms) or about political institutions or ideologies and B) were not about domestic or foreign spending priorities.

2c, which shows answers to non-political (but at least equally abstract) questions distributed fairly evenly across the whole space. If we accept that those lower levels of political competence—with less knowledge about politics and less confidence that they are legitimate producers of political opinions—will say “don’t know” more to political questions, this is good evidence that political competence is tied to social position.

Figure 2b shows that an even more consequential form of political abstention—not voting—displays essentially the same pattern as does saying “don’t know.” (Figure 2b includes fewer individuals than are shown in Figure 2a because only respondents to the 2006 GSS were asked about their voting in 2004; however, the category points for non-participation in all three elections included in this data are all located in the bottom half of the figure, and are all more than .4—the threshold for calling a difference “important”—from the category points for those elections’ reports of voting [not shown]). While social stratification of political participation is not itself a surprising result, the close correspondence between the patterns of the two kinds of non-participation is worth noting; those with less resources are less likely to express political opinions in any format⁵.

These figures together illustrate that those who are the least-advantaged are indeed the most likely to say “don’t know” to political questions. Further, they show that this is not a universal feature of responses to *all* kinds of questions; the locations in social space of those saying “don’t know” to non-political questions are far more varied than the locations of those who say they “don’t know” about politics. In other words, those with the most capital in the contemporary United States appear to have the highest levels of comfort answering political questions, while those with the least capital indeed are the most likely to absent themselves from political survey questions with “don’t know” responses. These results mirror those Bourdieu reported in *Distinction*; since survey researchers work hard to minimize “don’t know” responses (only one of the political, and none of the worldview, questions included here explicitly offers respondents the option of saying they “don’t know” or “haven’t thought much about” the issue), this is strong evidence that those located lower in the social space

have a sense that they are not socially legitimated producers of political opinions⁶.

⁵ This figure also shows an interesting pattern which is not the focus of this paper, but is discussed at greater length in an earlier paper using similar analyses (2013): the main difference between Republican and Democratic voting is along Axis 2.

⁶ In another paper, I used various forms of multivariate regression to show that this is not simply the outcome of the lower levels of education and thus technical political competence; there is a statistically significant relationship between income and political “don’t know” response, even controlling for education and other attributes that might contribute to technical competence.

Figure 3. Political Efficacy




Figure 3 shows answers to four questions used to measure “political efficacy.” While the concept of political efficacy is not identical in meaning to political competence, its operationalization in these items works well to gauge respondents’ sense of their entitlement to participate in politics. The category points in Figure 4 represent agreement and disagreement with the statements “people like me don’t have any say about what the government does” (Don’t Have Say), “I don’t think the government cares much what people like me think” (Gov’t Doesn’t Care), “I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the im-

portant political issues facing our country,” and “I think most people are better informed about politics and government than I am.” All four questions’ response category points move monotonically from the least-politically-competent responses, located among those with the least capital, to the most-politically-competent responses near the top of the figure. Those who say they “can’t choose” a response to these questions are located, on average, among those with the least resources, as is the case with the “don’t know” responses to political questions shown in Figure 2. Those who say they strongly disagree that “most peo-

ple” are better informed about politics and strongly agree that they possess a “good understanding” of politics tend to have the most resources; they are generally located in the same parts of the space as those who believe government *does* care about “people like” them and that they can have a say in political decision-making. The category points for all the responses indicating lower political competence are in the lower half of Figure 2; those with the least confidence in their knowledge of politics and their ability to influence their government tend to have the lowest volumes of capital. Again, we see a clear relationship between indicators of political competence and social position.

Conclusion

Responses to survey questions about politics, just like opinions people give about art, music, or other forms of cultural participation, are expressions of socially distinguished and distinguishing tastes. As Bourdieu (1991: 171-202) pointed out, the political field is a field of cultural and symbolic production; like tastes for other kinds of cultural objects, then, tastes for politics—and the probabilities of responding to survey questions, and of responding in specific ways—are structured by social position. But while most American cultural sociologists are comfortable with understanding certain kinds of cultural production as restricted to agents within the relevant fields, and with a relational analysis of the tastes and practices of those inside and outside those fields, these approaches to cultural production and reception have not been applied to American politics.

Volume of capital (Axis 1) clearly structures agents’ political competence. Those with the least capital are least likely to vote and most likely to say “don’t know” to political questions (and thus least likely to have their views represented accurately by political processes). The least-advantaged may not only lack the knowledge of politics needed to generate legitimate responses to political questions, they relate to politics, their survey-responses indicate, with the sense that they are not socially legitimated producers of political opinions: they lack political competence. Those with the most capital, on the other hand, are not only the most likely to answer political questions, they are also the most likely to vote and report the strongest levels of belief that they are capable of both understanding and influencing politics.

In this chapter, I have argued that both the theoretical insights and the empirical patterns described by Bourdieu in *Distinction* and “Public Opinion Does Not Exist” over thirty years ago apply to the Ameri-

can context. Much can be gained from bringing Bourdieu’s insights and tools to the study of American politics, for both our understanding of popular relations to politics. The concept of political competence” brings together socially-stratified phenomena usually studied separately: feelings about politics, survey-question answering, and voting. These three aspects of political participation are all manifestations of individuals’ sense of their place in the social order; those with more resources or capital are the most likely to feel they are legitimate participants in political decision-making, the most likely to express political opinions to survey interviewers, and the most likely to actually vote. These three elements of greater political competence are usually explained separately. Feelings of efficacy are most often attributed to individual socialization in the family, “don’t know” responses to lack of education or interest, and non-voting to insufficient skills and material resources. All of these certainly influence these individual phenomena, but a person’s basic sense of herself as warranting a place in national political discourse—her political competence—is a necessary precondition for any kind of political participation.

□

Daniel Laurison

Research Fellow in Sociology at London School of Economics

Abstract

The sense that one is a legitimate participant in political discourse, what Bourdieu (1984) termed “political competence,” is an important precondition for political engagement and participation. In this article, I examine the stratification of political competence across social positions in the United States. Using General Social Survey data from 2000-2006, I deploy Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) to construct a representation of the American social space. I then project two sets of measures of political competence as supplementary variables into the space constructed with MCA. I show that political competence—indicated by saying “don’t know” to political questions, and a series of questions designed to measure political efficacy—decreases with respondents’ volume of capital, as does the propensity to report voting in Presidential elections.

Keywords

Political competence, voting, United States, inequality, and multiple correspondence analysis

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På jagt efter klasse

Anmeldelse af Jens Arnholtz



Stine Tidemann Faber, Annick Prieur, Lennart Rosenlund & Jacob Skjøtt-Larsen:
Det skjulte klassesamfund
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Er klassesamfundet forsvundet? Er vi gået ind i en individualiseret tidsalder, hvor det ikke længere giver mening at tale om klasse? Er klasseforskellene blevet udvisket, så enhver nu er sin egen lykkes smed og kontanthjælpsmodtageren bare kan arbejde sig op til en position som bankdirektør, hvis han vil? Det er den slags spørgsmål, der danner baggrund for *Det skjulte klassesamfund*. Forfatterne gør det meget klart fra starten af: klasse er ikke noget man taler så meget om eller identificerer sig så meget med i nutidens Danmark. Det er de færreste, der positivt identificerer sig

med en bestemt klasse og endnu færre for hvem en sådan identifikation står centralt i deres umiddelbare selvforståelse. Er det så et udtryk for, at klasser ikke længere spiller en rolle i vores samfund? Svaret er nej: ikke alene kan der fortsat identificeres objektive sociale forskelle i vores samfund, men disse forskelle spiller også en stor rolle i folks forståelse af sig selv og deres omgivelser. Ikke som positiv identifikation med en bestemt klasse, men som negativ afsmag og afstandtagen fra andre grupper og klassers (formodede) væremåde. Som det udtrykkes i bogen: "Samtidig med at det er et metodisk problem, er det også et helt centralt fund i vores undersøgelser, at klasse kun italesættes indirekte og modstræbende" (s. 71). Forskningsmæssigt har man derfor været nødt til at 'gå på jagt efter klasse', ved at stille indirekte spørgsmål.

Det er kort fortalt konklusionen på det omfattende COMPAS-projekt, der med udgangspunkt i Aalborg har forsøgt at applicere Bourdieus klasseanalyse på danske forhold. At bruge Bourdieus analytiske tilgang handler ikke bare om at synliggøre objektive forskelle, men også om at synliggøre homologien mellem folks sociale position på den ene side og deres kulturelle forbrug, bopælspræferencer, personlige erfaringer, politiske holdninger og moralske ståsteder på den anden. For at synliggøre denne meget komplekse relation har forfatterne oparbejdet et meget omfattende empirisk materiale af spørgeskemaundersøgelser og interviews (beskrevet i kapitel 4), ligesom de tager afsæt i en ganske grundig gennemgang af Bourdieus klasseforståelse og de diskussioner, der har været af denne i den nyere litteratur (kapitel 3). Der er således ikke blot tale om et forsøg på at 'gentage' *Distinktionen*, men om at forsøge at videreudvikle dens analytiske indsigter ved hjælp af nyt empirisk materiale og nye fokuspunkter. Selv om forfatterne helt rigtigt bemærker at moralske spørgsmål også var en del af Bourdieus analytiske fokus, så fylder dette element f.eks. langt mere i *Det skjulte klassesamfund* end det gjorde i *Distinktionen*.

Udover klasserelationernes udtalte og skjulte karakter, er en anden vigtig konklusion fra projektet, at forfatterne i deres konstruktion af det sociale rum genfinder ”de samme to hoveddimensioner i den aalborgensiske sociale struktur, som Bourdieu fandt i det franske samfund i 1960’erne og 1970’erne: hierarkisk efter en dimension af samlet kapital (som danner grundlag for Bourdieus inddeling af sociale klasser), og sideordnet efter den relative betydning af de to former for kapital (som danner grundlag for Bourdieus inddeling af klasserne i klassefraktioner)” (s. 86). Det må i sig selv siges at være et uhyggelig interessant fund set i relation til al den nutidige snak om hvor forandret alting er og hvordan klasser ikke længere spiller nogen rolle.

Efter at have konstrueret det sociale rum i Aalborg opdeler forfatterne det i tre klasser (privilegerede, middelklasse og underprivilegerede) som igen hver opdeles i tre klassefraktioner (med henholdsvis kulturel, neutral og økonomisk kapitalsammensætning). Disse ni klassefraktioner bruges i den efterfølgende analyse, hvor de projiceres ind i de forskellige rum af kulturelle og politiske præferencer. Metodisk set er dette et brud med Bourdieus tilgang, og det indebærer at der trækkes nogle ret arbitrære skillelinjer i det sociale rum, som så efterfølgende substantialiseres til klassefraktioner. Set i lyset af at bogen handler om klasser og deres tilstedeværelse i nutidens samfund, er det en ret beskeden diskussion forfatterne vier til spørgsmålet om betydningen af dette metodiske greb og hvorfor man fortager det frem for at følge Bourdieus tilgang. Først i bogens konkluderende kapitel nævnes det kort, at de sociale forskelle har en kontinuerlig karakter og at disse klasseinddelinger derfor kan være problematiske. Der er sikkert gode grunde til at man har benyttet disse inddelinger, men vi får dem ikke rigtig ekspliciteret. I stedet bruges denne klasseinddeling relativt ukritisk som referenceramme i resten af bogen. Det er jo svært at gennemskue hvor problematisk dette er, men at en elektriker (hvilket er en af de mere akademisk krævende og bedre lønnede erhvervsuddannelser) bliver en gennemgående repræsentant for den økonomiske del af den underprivilegerede klasse synes umiddelbart mærkeligt og kunne måske skyldes den måde skillelinjerne er trukket på.

Efter at det sociale rum og klasserne er blevet konstrueret (kapitel 5) fokuserer analysen på en række forskellige smagspræferencer, holdninger og kategoriseringer af andre mennesker og deres relation til klassesetilhørsforhold. Det handler om bolig og bostedspræferencer i kapitel 6, kulturelt forbrug i kapitel 7, politisk forbrug i kapitel 8, moralske grænsedragninger i kapitel 9 og personlige erfaringer i kapitel 10.

Kapitlet om de geografiske skel er uhyre interessant. Analysen indeholder både statistiske elementer, som viser sammenhængen mellem klassefraktioner og tilsyneladende ’personlige’ præferencer. Det første af disse kapitler handler som nævnt om bosted. Det er en rigtig interessant analyse, fordi bosted viser sig at være en mere legitim metafor for klassesetilhørsforhold end klasse selv. Det er mere legitimt at sige, at man ikke ønsker at bo i Aalborg Øst, end at sige, at man ikke vil være en del af de mindre privilegerede klasser. Analysen viser for det første, at der er en sammenhæng mellem hvor man bor i Aalborg og ens økonomiske og kulturelle ressourcer. Selv om det måske ikke er så overraskende, at der kan findes ’dyre kvarterer’ (i byens udkant), hvor de økonomisk mest velstillede bor, så er det interessant at de kulturelt mest velstillede ofte bor i byens midte. De søger altså ikke så tæt på de dyre kvarterer som muligt, men har deres egne kulturelt disponerede præferencer. Bosted fungerer altså som en markør de privilegerede klasser imellem. For det andet viser analysen, at de fleste er glade for at bo der hvor de bor, men samtidig er der en implicit kamp (bl.a. i mediernes omtale af forskellige kvarterer) om at hierarkisere det geografiske rum. Der er altså på den ene side en tendens til en social hierarkisering af det geografiske rum. På den anden side er der også en kamp mellem forskellige hierarkier, hvilket kommer til udtryk ved at nogle af de mest populære steder samtidig også er nogle af de mest upopulære steder.

Det der kommer til udtryk her går igen igennem bogen som et mere generelt fund, nemlig at den sociale hierarkisering af smag og præferencer er mere tvetydig end hvad der var tilfældet i *Distinktionen*. På den ene side er der tendenser til at visse steder, kulturelle praksisser, politiske holdninger og opdragelsesformer tillægges større værdi end andre. På den anden side er der en (måske endnu stærkere) tendens til at alle ønsker at fremstå som ’almindelige’ og at ingen ønsker at fremstå som en del af en privilegeret gruppe. Forfatterne beskriver dette som en slags ’social blindhed’ blandt de privilegerede klasser, som ikke kan se hvor privilegerede de egentlig er. Man kunne dog også tolke det som et udtryk for en meget kraftig lighedsdiskurs, som de privilegerede bliver nødt til at navigere i forhold til.

Denne tendens blandt interviewpersonerne til at ’almindeliggøre’ sig selv og se sig selv som en del af middelklassen har måske fået forfatterne til at fokusere lidt vel meget på de privilegerede og de mindre privilegerede klasser, mens der kun er mindre fokus på de mellemliggende klasser. I forhold til analysen af bosted kunne det f.eks. have været interessant at høre,

hvorvidt der er en sammenhæng mellem om man tilhører de opadstræbende mellemklasser på den ene side og om man tilhører gruppen af personer, der er utilfredse med hvor man bor, på den anden. Det lyder umiddelbart som en sandsynlig hypotese og det kunne være interessant at høre om nogle af denne gruppes syn på relationen mellem bosted og klasse.

Kapitlerne om kulturelt og politisk forbrug er mere 'klassisk' *Distinktion*, omend forfatterne selvfølgelig har opdateret deres spørgsmål så de er tilpasset en nutidig, aalborgensisk kontekst. Der er rigtig mange interessante analyser af hvordan kulturelle og politiske forskelle manifesterer sig i nutidens Danmark, men der er også nogle problemer i disse analyser. Forfatterne har, for mig at se, lidt svært ved at vride de rigtige resultater ud af materialet. Det kan skyldes de forestillinger man har haft om hvad der ville markere kulturelle og politiske forskelle og dermed den måde man har spurgt på. Forfatterne nævner f.eks. selv, at de har overset nogle former for kulturelt forbrug (bil- og HiFi-messer), mens de måske har haft lidt for høje forventninger til aalborgensernes finkulturelle dispositioner. Det kan også skyldes, at der bare ikke er så store forskelle i det kulturelle forbrug som i 1960ernes Frankrig, hvilket forfatterne også er inde på (s. 139). Det er derfor mere afsmag end positive præferencer der markerer forskelle. Begge dele er efter min opfattelse helt legitime fund og bør tages til efterretning.

Der hvor problemerne opstår er når forfatterne forsøger at bruge korrespondanceanalyse til at synliggøre homologien mellem klassetilhørsforhold på den ene side og henholdsvis kulturelt og politisk forbrug på den anden side.

I figur 7.3 og 8.6 indplacerer forfatterne således ni 'klassefraktioner' som supplementære variable i et rum af henholdsvis kulturelt og politisk forbrug. Denne indplacering synes umiddelbart at give rigtig god sociologisk mening, hvis man kigger på korrespondancekortets diagonaler. Hvis man tager analysen af det kulturelle forbrug, finder man således ved at kigge på diagonalerne den samme struktur som i *Distinktionen* (stigende kulturelt forbrug med stigende samlet kapital og en differentiering mellem de økonomiske og kulturelle forbrugsmønstre, der passer sammen med klassefraktionerne). På den baggrund konkluderer forfatterne, at "analysen giver støtte til Bourdieus tese om *strukturel homologi*, idet rummet af livsstile synes struktureret efter de samme principper som de materielle eksistensbetingelser: nemlig kapitalvolumen og -sammensætning" (134).

Der er tale om meget kompetente forfattere, men jeg vil tillade mig at være uenig. Sagen er den, at

konklusionen drages på baggrund af diagonalerne og ikke selve akserne. Kortet synliggør helt klart en homologi, men i korrespondanceanalyse er det altså akserne, der 'strukturerer' rummet og ikke diagonalerne. Det er akserne man må tolke på for at finde ud af, hvad der adskiller dem på den ene side fra dem på den anden side. Der er derfor, efter min opfattelse, ikke belæg for at sige at "rummet af livsstile synes struktureret efter de samme principper som de materielle eksistensbetingelser: nemlig kapitalvolumen og -sammensætning". Det data viser er, at rummets struktureres af nogle langt mere sammensatte principper, hvilket forfatterne faktisk også selv er inde på undervejs. Problemet går igen i analysen af det politiske forbrug, hvor diagonalerne igen giver rigtig god sociologisk mening. Det fører til en meget pænere og mere meningsfuld, men matematisk set illegitim analyse. Begge kapitler indeholder mange rigtig spændende analyser af hvordan kultur og politik bruges som klassemarkører, men problemerne med konstruktionen af det rum, analyserne referer tilbage til, gør at man som læser skal holde tunge virkelig lige i munden for at finde ud af, hvad der holder og hvad der måske er mere problematisk.

De efterfølgende to kapitler, om symbolske grænsedragninger og klasseerfaringer er uhyre interessante. De baserer sig primært på kvalitativt materiale, som til gengæld fremstår meget righoldigt. I kapitlet bliver det tydeligt hvordan moralske udsagn bruges til at markere grænser i forhold til andre grupper og klasser. Det er uhyggelig svært kort at sammenfatte den ret komplicerede analyse, men kort fortalt synes der at være en tendens til at specielt de mindre privilegerede klasser bruger moralske markeringer til at tage afstand fra både endnu mere udsatte grupper (de dovne konstanthjælpsmodtagere, der ikke gider arbejde og de nassende indvandrere, som ikke vil bidrage til vores samfund), men også til de mere privilegerede grupper (som forsømmer deres børn for at gøre karriere og fokuserer for meget på penge). Her er virkelig tale om symbolsk vold, for ikke bare bruges disse moralske udmeldinger af de mere privilegerede klasser til at 'se ned på' den fordomsfulde, racistiske og Dansk Folkeparti-stemmende underklasse. Den underliggende fortælling i de mindre privilegeredes grænsedragninger handler også om, at man bare skal tage sig sammen, at man kan hvad man vil og at de da også kunne have tilhørt de mere privilegerede klasser, hvis de bare havde forsømt deres børn og fokuseret mere på pengene. Det er med andre ord en fortælling om, at det er deres eget valg. Disse moralske grænsedragninger er derfor et godt udtryk for, hvor illegitimt det åbenbart

er at tale om klasse i forhold til ens nuværende position.

Til gengæld viser kapitlet om klasseerfaringer, at specielt de mindre privilegerede grupper faktisk har en lang række konkrete erfaringer med klasseforskelle i deres liv. Altså erfaringer hvor de har oplevet ikke at slå til, at befinde sig i situationer der har været defineret af andre gruppers måde at begå sig på, og hvor de derfor ikke rigtig kunne gøre sig. Det er interessant at det netop er i relation til erfaringer i skolesystemet at disse erfaringer træder tydeligst frem; mere konkret i arbejderbørnenes erfaringer med gymnasiets borgerlige kultur. Men også i arbejdslivet er det specielt dem fra de mindre privilegerede klasser, som oplever at blive set ned på, talt grimt til og (værst af alt) helt usynliggjort. Igen kunne det dog have været interessant at høre lidt mere om de mellemliggende klassers arbejdsliv, om relationen mellem opadgående ambitioner og faktiske chancer. Men alt i alt er der tale om en rigtig interessant (omend svært sammenfattelig) analyse.

Samlet set er der tale om en rigtig interessant, velskrevet og velstruktureret bog. Indholdet af en del af bogens kapitler har allerede været publiceret forskellige andre steder, men en kvalitet ved bogen er, at de forskellige elementer her er samlet. Det giver mulighed for at synliggøre sammenhængen, ikke bare mellem klasse og enkelte præferencer, men også sammenhængen mellem forskellige præferencer (som politik, kultur, bolig og bosted, etc.). Denne kvalitet kunne forfatterne dog godt have trykket lidt tydeligere frem, evt. ved at lave en samlet model hvor alle elementer på en eller anden måde indgik. Når det er sagt, er der efter min mening tale om et meget gennemarbejdet stykke sociologisk analysearbejde, som fortjener at blive læst langt mere grundigt end hvad denne anmelder har haft tid til. Der er en hel stribe af analytiske pointer, som må kunne give anledning til nye undersøgelser og som må kunne spille ind i vores forståelse af de mekanismer, der former nutidens sociale verden.

Redaktion: Kim Esmark

Sociale mønsterbrydere og perfekte spioner

Verdens største forfatter af spionromaner, engelske John le Carré (f. 1931), der selv tjente i den britiske efterretningstjeneste i 1950'erne, kredser i hele sin lange række af koldkrigs- og post-koldkrigshistorier om falskspil, forstillelse, loyalitet, menneskeligt svig, politisk forræderi, korruption, retfærdighed og moralske dilemmaer. Temaer fra hans egen baggrund og opvækst hos en småkriminell far dukker ofte op som

fragmenter i romanerne, tydeligst og mest sammenhængende i mesterværket *A Perfect Spy* fra 1986. I et tv-interview fra 2002 peger le Carré i en tankevækkende ekskurs på, hvordan sociale mønsterbrydere (som han selv) med deres krydsede habitus og dybe, kropsliggjorte erfaring med at *agere noget man ikke er*, på sin vis er fødte spioner:

” My father was a crook, he was in and out of prison, con man... and his great ambition was that my brother and I should be projected into decent society. We came from working class stock, all my stock, my aunts and uncles spoke with solid regional accents and went to state schools, etc.

But for us nothing was too good and we were to be gents, we were going to be turned into gentlemen through the private education system. So, we did what spies do: we acquired the cloths, we acquired the mannerisms, we acquired the voice. We learned the hostilities and the code of the target that we were penetrating.

And we pretended that we came... (we didn't do all this with great calculation, but it was the consequence of the way we were launched into society) ... we pretended that we came from a stable two-parent family, and went to some fine house in the holidays, whereas we were quite often on the run from creditors and hopping from house to house, only ever with my father.

So, the duplicity was almost instilled in us, and the disproportion between the reality and the pretense was made perfect when we were very young.

And then, as luck would have it, I became a linguist, and I did enter the secret world, and when I arrived there I just felt I'd come home. It was that feeling that I could put my inherited larceny at the feet of my country and serve. ■



<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=89FHIGL3N54&feature=endscreen&NR=1>



Bourdieu i tidlig middelalder

Det nystartede middelalderhistoriske tidsskrift *Networks and Neighbours*, der fokuserer på ”the study of how people and communities interacted within and without their own world and localities in the Early Middle Ages” (dvs ca 400-1100), har et aktuelt call for papers ude, der viser hvordan Bourdieu gennem de senere år er blevet et mere og mere almindeligt referencepunkt i middelalderhistorisk forskning. Julinummeret 2014 vil således være ”dedicated to exploring the concept of ‘Cultural Capital’ as an idea, philosophy, and method of doing early medieval history”:

Since the idea was first proposed by Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, ‘Cultural Capital’ has broadened the way researchers of the modern world consider the meanings of ‘wealth’, ‘power’ and their relationship to real ‘capital’. The idea is no less relevant to the study of the Early Middle Ages. For this issue, we are seeking papers which investigate the literature and material goods of Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages; the polemics and the paintings, the buildings, coins, jewelry, *topoi*, prejudices, languages, dress, songs, and hair-styles that framed the early medieval world(s), and consider them in terms of ‘Cultural Capital’.

For example, what relation did Charlemagne’s moustache, his penchant for Augustine, and an elephant called Abul-Abbas have to his success as emperor? How did Rome become so central to the European imagination, even as its military and economic relevance waned? What role, if any, do Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages have in both the modern ‘European’ debate and the question of Scottish independence? Other issues to consider include: what constituted Cultural Capital in the Early Middle Ages, and why does it matter? Who created, exchanged, brokered, and consumed Cultural Capital? How did it translate into econom-

ic, symbolic, and social capital? And was Cultural Capital a force for social change, or inertia?

These are not meant to be prescriptive suggestions, and we welcome submissions which question, develop, or reject altogether Bourdieu’s approach.

I krydspunktet mellem middelalder og Bourdieu og i forlængelse af sidste temanummer af *Praktiske Grunde* om eliter, kan i øvrigt anbefales Richard Barton, *Lordship in the County of Maine, c. 890-1160* (Boydell Press, 2004), en original, teoretisk velfunderet og solidt empirisk baseret analyse af den aristokratiske elite i en region i Vestfrankrig, dens kapitalformer, habitus og sociale og politiske herskerstrategier.

CITAT

We have nothing but ourselves; we, mankind, flying on this lonely little planet; there is no greater task – no other task! – really, than before destroying ourselves, to find out how we can arrange our lives in such a way that we do not constantly hurt ourselves, and also gain as much pleasurable excitement and satisfaction as we can. You will rightly say: how do we do it? Now, another aspect of what I have to say is that one cannot do it by allowing one’s wishes to dominate one’s thinking. We all wish very much for the same, but by allowing our wishes to dominate our thinking we prevent us from doing the first thing which has to be done, and that is to find out *how our life together really works*.

Norbert Elias

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=50vSiFajfzo>

praktiske grunde

Nordisk tidsskrift for kultur- og samfundsvidenskab

Praktiske Grunde udgives af foreningen *Hexis • Forum for samfundsvidenskabelig forskning* og udkommer elektronisk med fire numre årligt.

Praktiske Grunde er et tværfagligt internordisk forum for analyse af sociale og kulturelle praksisformer, deres sociale genese, strukturelle betingelser, virkemåder og relation til magt- og dominansforhold.

Praktiske Grunde er til for at fremme den kritiske dialog mellem de mange forskellige forskere og studerende, der på forskellige måder og i forskellige sammenhænge arbejder med inspiration fra den franske sociolog Pierre Bourdieu og beslægtede forskere. Tidsskriftet redigeres således med afsæt i følgende basale videnskabelige grundantagelser:

- videnskabelig viden har både en teoretisk og en empirisk dimension
- det videnskabelige objekt er konstrueret gennem et brud med førstehåndsforståelsen
- at tænke i relationer giver bedre virkelighedsmodeller end at tænke den i substanser
- virkeligheden er historisk og fortiden virker i nutiden, både kollektivt og individuelt.

Praktiske Grundes tværfaglige redaktion består af et dansk, svensk og norsk redaktionspanel. Tidsskriftet bringer fagfællebedømte forskningsartikler, oversættelser af centrale fremmedsprogede tekster og anmeldelser. I tidsskriftets nyhedsbrev optages mindre essays, debatindlæg, bogomtaler, meddelelser om konferencer, seminarer, studiegrupper o.l. Praktiske grunde publicerer på dansk, svensk, norsk og engelsk.

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Vejledning til forfattere om manuskripter

Manuskripter til *Praktiske Grunde* indsendes elektronisk som vedhæftet fil i Word-format til praktiskegrunde@hexis.dk eller en af redaktørerne. *Praktiske Grunde* publicerer på dansk, norsk, svensk og engelsk. Efter fagfælle-vurdering indsendes et rettet og korrekturlæst manuskript som vedhæftet Word-fil. Med artiklen skal følge:

- engelsk abstract (max. 150 ord, husk engelsk titel)
- 5-8 keywords på engelsk
- forfatteroplysninger: navn, akademisk titel og/eller ansættelsessted, evt. e-mail

Opsætning og skrifttype

Brug standardopsætning. Skrifttype Times New Roman 12 pkt. Undgå enhver form for koder, skabeloner, typografier, overskriftsformattering o.l.!

Forkortelser, talord, termer

Rent sproglige forkortelser følger almindelig retskrivning. Årstal skrives med talord, f.eks. 1989, 1980'erne, '80erne, 1800-tallet. Termer på originalsprog kursiveres (f.eks.: ... med begrebet *Herrschaft* sigtede Weber til...).

Citater og citationstegn

Citater på indtil 4 linier anbringes i løbende tekst mellem ”dobbelt anførselstegn”. Citater på over 4 linier sættes separat i teksten, indrykket og uden anførselstegn. Ved markering af begreber og andet, som ikke er egentlige citater, bruges ’enkelt anførselstegn’ (f.eks.: ... der var tale om en art ’statsliggørelse’ af tænkningen...).

Henvisninger

- angives via forfatternavn, udgivelsesår og evt. side-tal i parentes indlagt løbende i hovedteksten: (Zahle 1996), (Bourdieu 1971: 45). Flere forfattere adskilles med semikolon: (Zahle 1996; Petersen 2007). Flere referencer af samme forfatter fra samme år alfabetiseres: (Bourdieu 1982a, 1982b).

Noter

Praktiske Grunde opererer med løbende numeriske fodnoter. Brug ikke flere noter end nødvendigt.

Tabeller og figurer

- skal være tydelige i et breddeformat af 7,5 eller 16 cm. De skal være nummererede og have en beskrivende rubrik.

Litteraturliste

- opføres alfabetisk efter hovedteksten, udformet med *Chicago manual of style* som forlæg:

Bog:

Honneth, A. 2006. *Kamp om anerkendelse*. København: Reitzel.

Ældre bog i nyt optryk eller senere oversættelse:

Weber, M. 1978. *Economy and society*. Berkeley: University of California Press [1922].

Bog med mere end en forfatter:

Prieur, A. og C. Sestoft 2006. *Pierre Bourdieu. En introduktion*. København: Reitzel.

Flere bøger / artikler af samme forfatter fra samme år:

Bourdieu, P. 2005a. *Viden om viden og refleksivitet*. København: Reitzel.

Bourdieu, P. 2005b. *The social structures of the economy*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Artikel i redigeret bog (antologi/samleværk):

Hanks, W.F. 1993. Notes on Semantics in Linguistic Practice. In *Bourdieu. Critical Perspectives*, red. C. Calhoun, E. LiPuma & M. Postone, 139-155. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Artikel i videnskabeligt tidsskrift:

Lenoir, R. 2006. An Intellectual and Personal Encounter. *Retfærd. Nordisk juridisk tidsskrift* 3/114: 7-22.

Nummer af tidsskrift, evt. med angivelse af tema:

Praktiske Grunde. Nordisk tidsskrift for kultur- og samfundsvidenskab 1-2, 2010. Tema: Bourdieu og staten. www.hexis.dk.

Artikel i dagblad:

Information 2007. Kritisk sociologi på anklagebænken. 10. september.

Henvisning til hjemmeside:

Hexis. <http://www.hexis.dk/forfattervejledning.html> [29. febr. 2011].